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RETHINKING REMOVABILITY
Jennifer Lee Koh*
Abstract
Removability, in the context of immigration law, refers to the
government’s legal authority to seek deportation for violations of the
federal immigration statute. Removability matters now more than ever
before, both for individuals facing possible deportation as well as for the
many governmental institutions charged with assessing removability.
Using four areas of emerging law—claims to U.S. citizenship, the
categorical approach to determining the immigration consequences of
crime, the application of the exclusionary rule in removal proceedings, and
the exercise of administrative discretion—this Article places removability
at the center of its analysis and presents a framework for better
understanding removability. Under what this Article calls a narrative of
“complex removability,” removability is both legally and factually
complex, as well as subject to change, notwithstanding the temptation in
legal and popular discourse to treat removability as simple and settled.
This Article identifies several common themes that characterize
complex removability today. First, obstacles to obtaining substantive,
discretionary relief have caused removability to become more complex.
Second, challenges to removability tend to be limited across the legal
system due to barriers associated with immigration detention, such as the
absence of counsel and the pressures of time. Third, complex removability
leads to a deeper appreciation of the fluidity and uncertainty associated
with immigration status. Fourth, complex removability is not static, but is
produced through dynamic interactions between the government and the
individual. Fifth, this Article explores the relationship between tensions in
the horizontal separation of powers and complex removability. This Article
concludes by suggesting several areas in which taking complex
removability seriously might bear upon immigration policy, practice, and
discourse.
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INTRODUCTION
What part of ‘illegal’ don’t you understand?1
This Article begins with the suggestion that there is quite a bit about
“illegal” in the immigration context that we do not yet understand. One
cannot understand what illegality in immigration means without
1. The phrase “What part of ‘illegal’ don’t you understand?” developed in the mid- to late2000s as a prominent rallying cry of the anti-immigrant movement, but its origins are unclear. The
phrase appears to have first been used in print in 2003 to criticize politicians for being too soft on
immigration enforcement. See Jon Dougherty, What Part of ‘Illegal’ Don’t They Understand?,
WND (Aug. 22, 2003, 1:00 AM), http://www.wnd.com/2003/08/20411. By 2007, the phrase had
permeated the national discourse and seemed to require no further explanation. See Lawrence
Downes, What Part of ‘Illegal’ Don’t You Understand?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/28/opinion/28sun4.html.
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acknowledging the relevance and complexity of the concept of
removability.2 Setting aside debates over the use of the term “illegal,”3 the
immigration laws generally do not employ the phrase “illegal alien” or
even “undocumented” to define the categories of noncitizens who might
face deportation.4 Instead, “removability” is the technical term that the
immigration laws use to refer to the threshold question of whether the
government has legal authority to attempt to deport someone.5 In order to
remove an individual, adequate proof must exist that the individual is a
noncitizen who violated specific provisions of the immigration laws.6
Removability is conceptually both broader and narrower than illegality or
unauthorized presence. It is broader in the sense that lacking authorization
2. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (2012) (defining removability).
3. See Flores v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 718 F.3d 548, 551 n.1 (6th Cir.
2013) (“We recognize that using the term ‘alien’ to refer to other human beings is offensive and
demeaning. We do not condone the use of the term and urge Congress to eliminate it from the U.S.
Code.”); THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLICY 452–53 (7th ed. 2012) (discussing use of phrases “illegal aliens,” “undocumented aliens,”
and “unauthorized migrants”); Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services,
Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1440–42
(1995) (analyzing the meaning of, and critiquing use of, the term “illegal alien”). For an example of
a news media debate on use of the term “illegal immigrant,” see Charles Garcia, Why “Illegal
Immigrant” is a Slur, CNN (July 6, 2012, 12:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/05/opinion/
garcia-illegal-immigrants (arguing that the term “illegal” to describe people “dehumanize[s] the
individual and generate[s] animosity toward them”) and Ruben Navarrette, “Illegal Immigrant” Is
the Uncomfortable Truth, CNN (July 6, 2012, 11:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/06/
opinion/navarrette-illegal-immigrant (arguing, in response to Garcia, that the phrase “illegal” is the
most accurate term to describe persons who lack valid immigration status).
4. The term “illegal alien” appears in only six provisions of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA), but the Act does not use the term to define the categories of persons subject to
deportation. See 8 U.S.C. § 1365 (providing reimbursement to states for the costs of incarcerating
“illegal aliens” with felony convictions); id. § 1252c(a) (authorizing state and local law enforcement
officials to arrest and detain “illegal aliens,” defined as individuals “illegally present” in the United
States with prior felony convictions who voluntarily or involuntarily left the country after such
conviction); id. § 1366 (requiring the Attorney General to submit a report containing data related to
incarceration and conviction rates for “illegal aliens”); id. § 1621(d) (permitting states to render
“illegal aliens” eligible for public benefits); id. § 1330 (providing for the Secretary of Treasury to
fund certain activities related to apprehension of “illegal aliens”); id. § 1356(r) (describing fund
related to detention of “illegal aliens”). The INA uses the term “alien” to refer to persons who are
not U.S. citizens or otherwise “owe[] permanent allegiance to the United States.” Id. § 1101(3),
(22); see also Flores, 718 F.3d at 551 n.1.
5. As explained in greater detail in Section I.A, removability exists where the government
proves that an individual violated any of the provisions in two subsections of the federal
immigration statute: the grounds of inadmissibility at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), or the grounds of
deportability at id. § 1227(a). Where statutory distinctions between inadmissibility, deportability,
and removability are relevant, this Article seeks to use the correct term. This Article otherwise uses
the term “removability” to refer to both inadmissibility and deportability grounds, as well as to the
general concept of establishing the government’s legal authority to pursue removal proceedings
against an individual.
6. See id. § 1229a(e)(2) (defining removability); see also Section I.A.
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to be present in the United States is only one of several ways in which a
person might become removable.7 Removability is narrower in the sense
that individuals with lawful status may also face charges of removability,
for instance, due to prior convictions or other post-entry conduct.8
Furthermore, millions of individuals might consider themselves
“undocumented” even though the government is not trying to remove
them; accordingly, the government has not yet adjudicated their
removability.9
In immigration practice, the meaning and scope of removability matter
more than ever. Removability questions have become more contested in
cases involving noncitizens defending charges of deportation.
Removability determinations may carry great consequences as well.
Because the immigration laws foreclose discretionary relief in many cases,
formally contesting removability may provide the noncitizen with the only
opportunity to avoid deportation.10 A noncitizen who succeeds in
contesting removability “wins” in the removal proceeding because the
immigration judge (IJ) must terminate the proceedings.11 In a meaningful
number of cases, termination does occur. In fiscal year 2012, IJs terminated
more than one in ten cases filed by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) in immigration courts.12 In thousands of other cases, contesting the
specific reasons for removability (for instance, whether removability is
based on a prior conviction, and if so, the nature of that conviction) can
7. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A).
8. See id. § 1227(a)(2); id. § 1182(a)(2).
9. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 2037, 2093
(2008) (discussing “de facto” government policy of tolerating unauthorized immigration, insofar as
a majority of individuals who lack immigration status are not actually removed).
10. See Jennifer Lee Koh, The Whole Better than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical
Approach to Determining the Immigration Consequences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 268
(2012).
11. EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2012 STATISTICAL YEAR
BOOK B1 (Mar. 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy12syb.pdf (“If the immigration judge
decides that removability has not been established by DHS, he or she may terminate the
proceedings.”).
12. Id. at D2 (showing that 13.3% of all removal cases resolved through termination, 16.1%
resolved through the grant of discretionary relief, 70.0% resolved through removal, and 0.6%
resolved through other means). The number of terminations as a percentage of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review’s (EOIR) overall docket appears to have increased over the past decade.
See id. (showing the percentage of cases terminated from FY 2008 to FY 2012 grew from 7.4% to
13.3%). In fiscal year 2000, only six percent of all cases resulted in termination. See EXEC. OFFICE
FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK 2000 I2–I3 (Jan. 2001),
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/SYB2000Final.pdf. While the termination of removal
proceedings in many cases is the result of the DHS failing to establish removability, termination
may also occur under circumstances that still lead to the removal of the individual, for instance
where DHS seeks termination of the immigration court proceedings because the agency wishes to
remove the individual through administrative mechanisms that do not involve a removal order
issued by an immigration judge.
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also affect the individual’s right to seek discretionary relief. A viable
removability challenge may have other ramifications for the individual
facing deportation beyond outright termination of the proceedings.
Removability determinations may lead to the release on bond of
noncitizens who are otherwise subject to draconian mandatory detention
statutes.13 Judicial review of removal orders,14 questions related to the
execution of wrongful removal orders (i.e., orders that lack a legal basis),15
and defenses to criminal prosecutions for immigration-related crimes16
may also hinge on questions related to removability.
Removability thus affects multiple government actors in a variety of
ways. For the federal courts, removability questions constitute one of the
few avenues through which the judiciary can affect the scope and
application of federal immigration law.17 For the immigration enforcement
agencies, removability questions implicate the legality of agency action.18
Furthermore, the expanding series of sub-federal laws that attempt to
regulate immigration19 have the effect of requiring state governmental
13. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (providing mandatory detention for aliens who are inadmissible
or deportable based on criminal grounds); Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799 (B.I.A. 1999) (providing
opportunity to seek release on a bond for noncitizen who is substantially likely to prevail, including
during the removability phase of the hearing); see also Faiza W. Sayed, Note, Challenging
Detention: Why Immigrant Detainees Receive Less Process than “Enemy Combatants” and Why
They Deserve More, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1850–58 (2011) (describing and identifying
procedural shortcomings in the Joseph hearings).
14. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (depriving federal courts of judicial review over final
removal orders against a noncitizen who “is removable” as a result of certain crime-based grounds
of removability); Rebecca Sharpless, Fitting the Formula for Judicial Review: The Law-Fact
Distinction in Immigration Law, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 57, 61–65 (2010).
15. Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and
the Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 148–49 (2010).
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (criminalizing and defining illegal re-entry); infra notes 88–93 and
accompanying text.
17. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Business as Usual: Immigration and the National Security
Exception, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1485, 1524–25 (2010) (noting that the federal courts defer to the
plenary power of Congress to regulate immigration).
18. See DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE NEW AMERICAN
DIASPORA 98–102 (2012) (distinguishing between minor, “bureaucratic mistakes” in the deportation
system, which are “unlikely to have serious consequences,” and “forensic mistakes,” the most
serious being the deportation of U.S. citizens, which are “inherently more serious because they
involve incorrect decisions undertaken by those who have been given legal authority to act
decisively in the public sphere” (emphasis omitted)).
19. Significant scholarly literature on immigration federalism, or the appropriate balance of
power between federal and nonfederal authorities in regulating immigration, has emerged in the past
decade. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State Regulation of
Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 (2011) (explaining “mirror-image theory”
justification for subfederal immigration laws, such as Arizona’s SB 1070, and critiquing subfederal
immigration laws as unconstitutional); Kati L. Griffith, Discovering “Immployment” Law: The
Constitutionality of Subfederal Immigration Regulation at Work, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 389
(2011) (arguing for preemption of subfederal laws that sanction employers for employing
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actors who lack expertise in the immigration laws to structure their
behavior around potentially complex questions related to removability. For
instance, § 6 of the infamous Arizona immigration law SB 1070, though
invalidated by the Supreme Court in 2012 in Arizona v. United States,20
would have authorized the warrantless arrest of any individual whom
Arizona law enforcement had reason to believe “committed any public
offense that makes the person removable from the United States.”21
The much-anticipated Arizona decision resolutely affirmed the federal
government’s central role in the regulation of immigration.22 But the
opinion also reflected a less recognized conceptual shift in the Court’s
treatment of removability. Justice Kennedy’s opinion observed that “[a]s a
general rule, it is not a crime for a removable alien to remain present in the
United States.”23 Justice Kennedy recognized the misperception, often
present in immigration-related discourse, that being removable is
equivalent to engaging in criminal behavior.24 Instead, Justice Kennedy
drew attention to the critical distinction between an individual’s being
subject to removal and committing a crime.25 In addition, Arizona
acknowledged the unsettled nature of removability itself, notably using the
phrase “possible removability”26 more than once to describe the legal
posture of persons targeted by SB 1070.27 The Court also noted that
“possible removability” not only conflicts with the procedural framework
envisioned by the federal immigration laws, but is also complicated by the
fact that, substantively, “[t]here are significant complexities involved
in . . . determin[ing] whether a person is removable.”28
The Arizona view of removability, as complex and distinct from
illegality, is still an evolving one. According to the conventional story
about removability—the story that typically dominates immigration
practice, policy, and discourse—removability inquiries are simple, settled,
and easy to determine. But the standard narrative that removability
undocumented immigrant workers); Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of
Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787 (2008) (arguing for the constitutionality of some
forms of state and local immigration regulation); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the
Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008) (questioning the prevailing
doctrine that the federal government has exclusive authority over immigration).
20. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012).
21. Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act § 6, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3883(a)(5) (2010).
22. See David Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41, 41–42, 47 (2012)
(noting the attention paid by both sides of the immigration debate to the Supreme Court decision in
Arizona and that the decision favored federal government authority in immigration regulation).
23. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505 (citing INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984)).
24. See id. at 2499, 2504–05, 2530–31.
25. Id. at 2504.
26. Id. at 2505 (emphasis added); accord id. at 2506; id. at 2507.
27. Id. at 2505–07.
28. Id. at 2506.
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involves a straightforward inquiry, this Article contends, is both
incomplete and inaccurate. As one court explained, the removability
“determination can be relatively straightforward,” while the question of
whether a person is entitled to discretionary relief “is often complex and
fact-intensive.”29 But a more pernicious aspect of the simple view of
removability has surfaced in public rhetoric. The public’s receptivity to the
simple story of removability is most visible in the already noted rallying
cry of the anti-immigrant movement: “What part of illegal don’t you
understand?”30
Viewing removability as simple is not necessarily a bad thing. In many
individual cases, it is both accurate and harmless to contend that
removability is easy to determine.31 But a central premise of this Article is
that removability is far more complex than the current legal system and
public discourse suggest. Arizona correctly relied on the notion that
determining removability is complex as a basis for its finding that the state
of Arizona was ill-equipped to engage in removability determinations.32
The issues at play in Arizona did not leave room to explore the nuances
associated with the federal government’s treatment of removability. At the
federal level, for instance, respondents in immigration courts routinely
concede removability, without the benefit of counsel and at times during
group removal proceedings.33 Other times, removability is examined not by
an immigration judge, but by a low-level immigration officer with the
authority to issue removal orders that bypass the immigration courts.34 And
yet a closer look at removability across the federal system suggests that
removability is more dynamic and shifting than the current system
accounts for. The narrative of complex removability in this Article focuses
on areas of federal policy and practice that inadequately account for
removability’s contested nature.
This Article tells a story about removability in which it is complex,
29. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 491 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
30. See supra note 1.
31. In holding that criminal defense counsel had an affirmative duty to correctly advise
noncitizen defendants of the immigration consequences of a guilty plea, the majority opinion in
Padilla v. Kentucky correctly recognized that in Mr. Padilla’s case removability was “succinct,
clear, and explicit.” See 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010). The Court went on to acknowledge, “[T]here
will . . . undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation consequences of a particular
plea are unclear or uncertain,” but “when the deportation consequence is truly clear . . . the duty to
give correct advice is equally clear.” Id.; see also infra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing
Justice Alito’s emphasis on the complexity of categorical approach determinations in his concurring
opinion in Padilla).
32. See Arizona, 132 S. Ct at 2505–07 (noting that “the removal process is entrusted to the
discretion of the Federal Government,” and that “removability [decisions] . . . . touch on foreign
relations and must be made with one voice,” not through state governments acting without the
authorization of the federal government).
33. See infra notes 398–405 and accompanying text.
34. See infra note 405 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 4

1810

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

contested, and far from settled. Several rapidly evolving areas of
immigration doctrine underscore removability’s contested nature. For
example, individuals may not be removable at all because they are U.S.
citizens. But whether an individual charged with removability is a U.S.
citizen, or has a colorable claim to U.S. citizenship, may depend on legal
and factual complexities that make an immediate answer unclear.35
Whether a noncitizen’s prior conviction falls into a category of offenses
that makes the noncitizen removable is, potentially, a complex matter that
can trigger years of litigation. The issue is further complicated because the
judiciary and administrative agencies are still debating many of the basic
guidelines for analyzing the immigration consequences of crime.36
Whether the courts should suppress evidence of alienage may also involve
the application of rapidly evolving legal standards and contested factual
allegations.37 Even if a noncitizen does not have an immigration status that
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) recognizes, she might still be
eligible for an exercise of administrative discretion that would prohibit
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) from using its
enforcement powers.38 In each of these areas, the courts and the various
immigration-related administrative agencies39 have expended significant
resources into determining whether noncitizens are removable. At the same
time, the law in these areas remains unsettled.
In the immigration law scholarship, removability’s shifting and
contested nature has been underexamined. Although removability
challenges have grown increasingly important to removal defense practice,
the scholarship reflects comparatively less attention to the meaning and
significance of removability. To be sure, scholars have recognized that
immigration status, particularly unlawful immigration status, is “complex
[and] highly discretionary.”40 They have helpfully reflected upon various
factors that expose the erroneousness of assuming that a person without
immigration documents is unquestionably “illegal.” Such factors include
the complexity of lawful statuses and forms of immigration relief

35. See infra Section II.A.
36. See infra Section II.B.
37. See infra Section II.C.
38. See infra Section II.D.
39. The federal administrative agencies most commonly involved in immigration enforcement
and adjudication include the three core immigration sub-agencies of the Department of Homeland
Security (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, and Citizenship
and Immigration Services) and two adjudicatory sub-agencies housed under the Department of
Justice (the Executive Office of Immigration Review, comprised of immigration judges; and the
Board of Immigration Appeals). See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 2–6 (5th ed. 2009).
40. Hiroshi Motomura, The Rights of Others: Legal Claims and Immigration Outside the
Law, 59 DUKE L.J. 1723, 1742–43 (2010).
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available, and the possibility of acquiring permanent status.41 Scholars
have recognized that undocumented immigrants occupy a precarious place
under the law and enjoy cognizable, though highly circumscribed, rights.42
This is particularly evident in laws that are not immigration-related in
nature, such as workplace rights.43 These scholars have discussed problems
with the immediate classification of noncitizens into fixed categories of
“illegal,” “legal,” and “citizen.”44 As immigration law scholar Professor
Hiroshi Motomura noted, “[T]he line between legal and illegal
immigration is not—and has never been—clear and impermeable.”45
Indeed, Professor Daniel Kanstroom has emphasized various dimensions
of complexity associated with deportation and removal, particularly related
to the rights of individuals who have been physically deported but whose
removal orders are later found to be legally defective, and has explored
41. Professor Hiroshi Motomura noted that some courts view immigration law violations as
“self-executing,” a belief that is premised upon the flawed understanding of the immigration laws as
simple, and has discussed how the self-executing view of immigration affects the wisdom of
allowing state and local government to participate in immigration enforcement. Motomura, supra
note 9, at 2060; see also Stephen Legomsky, Portraits of the Undocumented Immigrant: A
Dialogue, 44 GA. L. REV. 65, 110–11 (2009) (illustrating, through a dialectic between fictitious law
professors, the tension between the views that “unlawful status is usually pretty obvious” on one
side of the debate and that drawing a conclusion regarding unlawful status can be complex, even for
federal immigration officials, on the other side); Motomura, supra note 9, at 2047–55 (describing
various ways in which persons without lawful immigration status might either acquire lawful status,
or not be physically deported notwithstanding the absence of such status); Neuman, supra note 3, at
1440 (asserting that immigration “law is more complex than most politicians and voters realize,”
and pointing to the wide variety of statuses and circumstances that might allow someone without
formal authorization from the government to reside in the United States); Huyen Pham, When
Immigration Borders Move, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1115, 1156–57 (2009) (discussing the range of rights
and limitations associated with various immigration statuses).
42. See Motomura, supra note 40, at 1742–43. Professor Motomura has helpfully explored
the ways in which undocumented immigrants, despite their inability to formally assert rights in
many instances, are nonetheless capable of asserting rights “indirectly and obliquely by making
transsubstantive arguments” that fall into several analytic patterns. Id. at 1723. Motomura’s analysis
includes the assertion of claims by undocumented immigrants both as part of the removal process as
well as under nonimmigration laws, and does so in order to articulate the scope and effects of
widespread “national ambivalence” towards unauthorized immigration. Id. at 1723–24. By contrast,
this Article focuses on the assertion of claims by individuals facing removal under the federal
immigration laws in order to help shape our understanding of removability. To a lesser degree, this
Article also focuses on a normative assessment of immigration policy, practice, and discourse in
light of the complex nature of removability.
43. Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity of the Undocumented
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 955, 990–94 [hereinafter Bosniak, Exclusion
and Membership]; Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage
Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1047, 1115–17 (1994).
44. See generally Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership, supra note 43, at 1000–03
(discussing distinct and conflicting legal regimes that regulate undocumented immigrants);
Motomura, supra note 9, at 2047–55 (emphasizing that immigration status, including unlawful
status, is inherently discretionary).
45. Motomura, supra note 40, at 1785.
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how status, territoriality, finality, and time work together in unexpected
and complicated ways.46 This Article builds upon the existing literature,
but focuses specifically on removability at the center of a conceptual
framework. It treats removability as a specific legal inquiry, worthy of
independent study, both in terms of how it works as well as how
removability matters for related subjects such as unlawful status. This
Article shares other scholars’ normative commitment to demonstrating that
illegality in the immigration laws is complex and contestable, but it does so
by focusing on the boundaries of the government’s capacity to remove and
with a focus on federal law and policy.
In so doing, this Article maps the content and meaning of removability,
and encourages readers to rethink the concept of removability–specifically,
to take the “complex” view of removability more seriously. Part I explains
the statutory basis for understanding removability and describes its
relevance in immigration practice and policy today. Part II contends that
the immigration laws reflect a story of “complex removability.” To
illustrate complex removability, Part II is organized around four areas in
which the courts and executive branch are actively grappling with the
boundaries of removability. These four areas (each of which is still in the
process of evolving) are (1) the assertion of claims to citizenship as a
defense to removal; (2) the application of the categorical approach in
determining the immigration consequences of crime; (3) efforts to suppress
evidence of alienage in removal proceedings following an unlawful search
or seizure; and (4) the exercise of administrative discretion, with a focus on
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), created in 2012 by the
Obama Administration for certain categories of people—known as
DREAMers—who came to the United States as children.
After identifying complex removability as a legal phenomenon, Parts III
and IV analyze what complex removability entails and how it might make
a difference in immigration law, policy, and discourse today. Part III
articulates common themes that help shape the narrative of complex
removability. Part III begins with the observation that growing difficulties
in obtaining substantive, discretionary relief have led to contests in
removability. This Part goes on to discuss how challenges to removability
tend to be limited across the legal system due to barriers associated with
immigration detention, such as the absence of counsel and the pressures of
time. Nonetheless, complex removability leads to a deeper appreciation of
the fluidity and uncertainty associated with immigration status, in which
removability and status are interconnected but one is not necessarily
dispositive of the other. Part III proceeds to discuss the nature of
removability as the product of dynamic interactions between the
government and the individual, as well as the extent to which horizontal
46. See KANSTROOM, supra note 18, at 98–102; see also DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION
NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2007).
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separation of powers tensions are relevant to removability determinations.
Finally, Part IV provides, in broad sketches, several recommendations
that follow from rethinking removability. It first suggests removing the
conditions that necessitate complex challenges to removability, for
instance, by restoring substantive immigration relief through legislative
reform. Realizing that meaningful legislative reform might not take place,
this Part also suggests additional reforms that seek to facilitate the
development of removability claims for more individuals who could
potentially invoke them. Part IV ends with discursive implications of
rethinking removability.
I. INTRODUCING REMOVABILITY
This Part explores the preliminary question of why removability
matters. It first explains the statutory basis for defining removability, a
term related to concepts familiar to experts in immigration law, such as
grounds of inadmissibility, grounds of deportability, and admission. It then
describes how removability affects, and is affected by, other parts of the
modern immigration framework, including immigration adjudication,
judicial review, and the legality of agency decisions. This background
underscores the erroneousness of assuming that removability is necessarily
simple and clear.
A. Understanding the Legal Basis for Removability
When can the government deport someone? Understanding
removability starts—as with most issues in immigration law—with an
examination of the federal immigration statute. Under the INA, any
noncitizen who the government wishes to deport must be deemed
“removable” by an immigration judge (IJ).47 It is worth noting that
determining removability precedes determination of whether an individual
is entitled to discretionary relief from removal. As one court explained,
“[t]o order an individual removed, the immigration judge must make two
determinations: (1) whether the individual is removable from the United
States; and, if so, (2) whether the individual is otherwise eligible for relief
from removal.”48 Removability refers to the government’s legal authority
to deport a person.49 After an IJ establishes removability, then an inquiry
into whether an individual may apply to remain in the country through a
grant of discretionary relief50—must take place. Thus, entitlement to
47. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (2012) (“An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for
deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”).
48. Morales-Izquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 491 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also
Matovski v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 722, 727 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining the two phases in removal
proceedings).
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(e)(2) (defining “removable”).
50. E.g., id. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(iii) (granting discretion to the Attorney General to waive
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discretionary relief constitutes a separate inquiry from removability.51
Determining removability inevitably rests in part on a close reading of
numerous statutory provisions. Technically, since 1996, the definition of
removability has depended on whether a noncitizen has violated either the
grounds of inadmissibility, found at § 1182 of Title 8 of the United States
Code, or the grounds of deportability, found at § 1227 of the same title.52
Which provision applies depends on whether a noncitizen has been
formally “admitted” to the United States.53 If admitted, the grounds of
deportability apply; if applying for admission (i.e., never “admitted”), the
grounds of inadmissibility apply.54 Though not identical, the grounds of
inadmissibility and deportability generally describe categories of behavior
that can lead to removal. These categories include immigration-related
offenses (such as entering without inspection or overstaying one’s visa),
criminal grounds, and national security grounds, among others.55
The term “admission,” like many other terms in immigration law, is a
statutory term of art with a precise definition that does not necessarily
comport with common sense. An explanation of the “admission” concept
demonstrates one of the many ways in which legal fictions permeate the
immigration laws. An individual has only been “admitted” after a
successful inspection by an immigration officer.56 Thus, although the
“undocumented” population includes an almost even distribution of
individuals who entered lawfully but overstayed their visas and individuals
who crossed a border without authorization, the former group has been
“admitted” while the latter has not.57 These two groups of undocumented
deportation “for humanitarian purposes, [i.e., persecution,] to assure family unity, or when it is
otherwise in the public interest”).
51. See id. § 1229a(c)(4) (describing applications for relief from removal).
52. See id. §§ 1182, 1227.
53. See id. § 1229a(e)(2) (“The term ‘removable’ means—(A) in the case of an alien not
admitted to the United States, that the alien is inadmissible under section 1182 of this title, or (B) in
the case of an alien admitted to the United States, that the alien is deportable under section 1227 of
this title.”); id. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (defining “admission” to mean “the lawful entry of the alien into
the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer”).
54. Prior to 1996, the immigration laws distinguished between persons who were
“excludable” and those who were “deportable”—the key distinction being whether the person had
physically entered the United States through authorized means. For a brief history, see David A.
Martin, A Defense of Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris
Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 167, 172–73 (2012).
55. As scholars have shown, the grounds of exclusion and deportation historically reflected
those segments of society deemed undesirable. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 46, at 5 (arguing
that a deportation system constitutes a form of “discretionary social control” and reflects
xenophobic biases in society).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).
57. See Fact Sheet: Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population, PEW HISP.
CENTER (May 22, 2006), http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/19.pdf (indicating that forty to fifty
percent of the currently unauthorized population entered lawfully through recognized ports of
entry).
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immigrants are thus in procedurally different postures vis-à-vis the
immigration statute if placed in removal proceedings. The first group,
having been previously admitted on a valid visa, is subject to grounds of
deportability.58 The second group, having entered without inspection,
would be deemed to have never been “admitted” and would therefore face
removal under the grounds of inadmissibility.59 But the lawfulness of one’s
status, alone, does not necessarily dictate which grounds apply. Although
lawful permanent residents are generally subject to the grounds of
deportability, they might face permanent deportation under the grounds of
inadmissibility if, for instance, they traveled abroad and sought readmission at the border.60
Moreover, the potential lack of clarity around the definition of
“admission”61 can further complicate the preliminary question of which
statutory provision should serve as a benchmark against which to evaluate
removability. The grounds of inadmissibility and deportability contain
small but significant differences, with the inadmissibility grounds
encompassing a slightly broader realm of conduct.62 Sometimes, whether
the grounds of inadmissibility or the grounds of deportability apply
matters. Finding that an individual is subject to grounds of deportability,
but not inadmissibility, can prevent DHS from establishing removability in
certain cases. For instance, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) ruled
in 2012 that refugees, even though conditionally admitted to the United
States, have nonetheless been “admitted” such that they are subject only to
grounds of deportability (and not grounds of inadmissibility),63 thereby
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B) (describing “[c]lasses of deportable aliens” as those who are “in
and admitted in the United States” who are deemed to have engaged in certain forms of conduct,
such as being “present in the United States in violation of the [INA]”).
59. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (“An alien present in the United States without being
admitted or paroled, or who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible.”).
60. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) (describing categories of lawful permanent residents who
should be regarded as “seeking an admission . . . for purposes of the immigration laws”); Vartelas v.
Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1490 (2012) (holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), which treats a
returning lawful permanent resident who has committed an offense described at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(2), does not apply retroactively to offenses committed prior to the statute’s enactment in
1996).
61. See, e.g., Quilantan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 285, 285, 290–92 (B.I.A. 2010) (holding that, for
purposes of adjustment of status, an alien has been “admitted” if they can “prove procedural
regularity in his or her entry, which does not require the alien to be questioned by immigration
authorities or be admitted in a particular status”); Areguillin, 17 I. & N. Dec. 308, 310 (B.I.A.
1980) (same).
62. See Richard Frankel, Illegal Emigration: The Continuing Life of Invalid Deportation
Orders, 65 SMU L. REV. 503, 513–15 (2012).
63. D-K-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 761, 761 (B.I.A. 2012) (holding that refugees, who have been
conditionally admitted to the United States, have nonetheless been “admitted” under the statute and
therefore may face removal proceedings only if charged with deportability grounds and not
inadmissibility grounds).
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slightly minimizing the range of circumstances that might subject a refugee
to deportation.64
The mere fact that removability involves a potentially detailed statutory
analysis does not, by itself, suggest anything remarkable about the
removability inquiry. The next section describes why removability matters
during the removal process.
B. Why Removability Matters
In individual immigration cases, removability determinations go to the
heart of the immigration enforcement agency’s authority to sanction an
individual.65 As noted above, removability is fundamentally a statutory
question of whether the person has violated one of two sections of the
INA.66 But removability determinations also affect the government’s
enforcement powers beyond the threat of deportation itself, including its
detention authority and judicial review.
Importantly, to establish removability, DHS must meet a requisite legal
burden. As a preliminary matter, the government must prove alienage—or
that the individual charged with removability is not a citizen of the United
States.67 Where the grounds of deportability apply, the government also
bears the burden of proving removability “by clear and convincing
evidence” that is “reasonable, substantial, and probative.”68 When an
individual is charged under grounds of inadmissibility, however, the
individual bears the burden of proving admissibility.69 The applicable
burdens of proof illustrate the potential significance of a seemingly
technical detail like being charged on inadmissibility versus deportability
grounds. As noted above, the government’s inability to establish
removability leads to termination of the proceedings.70
Removability has rigid, seemingly black-and-white consequences in
some respects, but reflects a sense of gradation in other respects. Whether a
person is removable at all ultimately bears upon the government’s power to
exact what many perceive as the ultimate sanction in the immigration
realm: physical deportation from the United States. But different shades of
removability exist too, and the kind of removability that applies can have
64. See also Frankel, supra note 62, at 515–20 (describing DHS’s practice of subjecting
wrongfully deported individuals seeking to return to the United States to the more stringent
inadmissibility standards rather than the deportability standards).
65, See, e.g., D-K-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 770 (“[R]emovability is a threshold determination.”).
66. See supra Section I.A.
67. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2013).
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012).
69. See id. § 1229a(c)(2) (“In the proceeding the alien has the burden of establishing—(A) if
the alien is an applicant for admission, that the alien is clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be
admitted and is not inadmissible . . . or (B) . . . that the alien is lawfully present in the United States
pursuant to a prior admission.”).
70. See supra Section I.A.
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profound consequences. For instance, an individual found to be removable
because of a conviction for an “aggravated felony”71 could face
immigration consequences that are qualitatively—and procedurally—
different than an individual who is found to be removable because she
lacks proper immigration papers.72 Aggravated felony convictions
categorically disqualify most noncitizens from even applying for many
forms of discretionary relief.73 For unlawful permanent residents,
aggravated felony grounds can also result in truncated administrative
removal proceedings before front-line immigration officers that deprive
them of a court hearing before an IJ.74 Thus, whether a person is removable
matters. But the kind of removability that attaches may matter just as
much.
Contesting removability constitutes one of the few avenues that can
weaken the otherwise rigid application of the mandatory immigration
detention statutes. While DHS has the authority to detain any person
charged with removability,75 the INA requires that certain categories of
noncitizens be detained with no opportunity to seek release on bond from
an IJ.76 The majority of persons subject to mandatory detention are
inadmissible or deportable under one of the criminal-based grounds of
inadmissibility and deportability.77 The mandatory detention statutes, while
heavily critiqued,78 have nonetheless persisted since 1996 and help explain
why the number of noncitizens in immigration detention has skyrocketed
over the past fifteen years.79 However, one of the few avenues for seeking
release from mandatory detention that the courts have recognized is a
hearing in which the noncitizen must show that the government is
“substantially unlikely” to prevail in establishing its case, which
noncitizens may satisfy by showing that they are not removable under one
71. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (listing approximately twenty-eight categories and
subcategories of crimes that constitute aggravated felonies for immigration purposes).
72. Id. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).
73. See 6 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 71.05[2][c]–[d]
(2013) (describing the immigration consequences of aggravated felony convictions).
74. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228(a)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1 (2013) (describing administrative removal
proceedings for noncitizens who are not lawful permanent residents and who have convictions that
are aggravated felonies).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
76. See id. § 1226(c); see also id. § 1226a(a) (requiring mandatory detention of suspected
terrorists).
77. See id. § 1226(c)(1).
78. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration
Detention, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601 (2010); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration
Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 51 (2010) (emphasizing the continuing
“excessiveness” of immigration detention despite the Obama Administration’s proposed reforms).
79. DHS currently operates approximately 33,400 immigration detention bed spaces. U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2012 BUDGET IN BRIEF 10 (2012), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/budget-bib-fy2012.pdf.
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of the alleged grounds.80 An early assessment of the noncitizen’s
removability argument may thus strip DHS of the authority to categorically
require detention without bond.81
The availability of judicial review may also hinge on questions related
to removability. The current version of the INA continues to reflect the
principle that judicial review cannot be taken for granted in the
immigration context.82 If a noncitizen “is removable” due to a prior
conviction, then the individual is barred from seeking federal judicial
review over denials of discretionary relief, or questions of fact.83 However,
judicial review remains available for “questions of law,” including whether
the immigrant is removable at all.84
Furthermore, because removability is primarily a legal rather than a
discretionary question, incorrect removability determinations may lead to
the execution of removal orders that lack a legal basis altogether. Wrongful
removal orders raise a host of questions with which the courts continue to
wrestle. These questions include whether noncitizens who are physically
deported have a right to return to the United States when they are
subsequently found to have been not removable or when the type of
removability associated with a removal order is later found to be incorrect,
a question that goes to the legality of certain federal regulations.85 The
practical difficulty that deported noncitizens face in trying to return to the
80. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. 799, 800 (B.I.A. 1999). However, one study has shown that
Joseph hearings are rarely granted in practice. See Julie Dona, Making Sense of “Substantially
Unlikely”: An Empirical Analysis of the Joseph Standard in Mandatory Detention Custody
Hearings, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 65, 87–88 (2011).
81. Joseph, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 803.
82. Judicial review has historically been circumscribed for noncitizens. See Lenni B. Benson,
Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29
CONN. L. REV. 1411, 1419–38 (1997) (describing the history of judicial review in the immigration
context).
83. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) (2012) (precluding judicial review of final orders of
removal against criminal aliens), and id. § 1252(a)(2)(B) (precluding judicial review of denials of
discretionary relief), with id. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (“Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C) . . . shall be
construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law . . . .”).
84. See supra note 83.
85. A pair of federal regulations known as the “post-departure bar” precludes noncitizens
from filing a motion to reopen or reconsider a removal case after their physical departure from the
United States, even where the original removal orders were wrongfully executed. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(d) (2013) (governing motions filed with the BIA); id. § 1003.23(b)(1) (governing motions
filed with the immigration courts). The post-departure bar has been challenged in federal court and
found invalid by at least nine federal courts of appeal. See Garcia-Carias v. Holder, 697 F.3d 257,
263 (5th Cir. 2012); Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236, 1238 (11th Cir. 2012);
Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811, 816–18 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Prestol Espinal
v. Att’y Gen., 653 F.3d 213, 217–18 (3d Cir. 2011); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 101–02 (2d Cir.
2011); Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 235 (6th Cir. 2011); Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d
591, 593–95 (7th Cir. 2010); Coyt v. Holder, 593 F.3d 902, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2010); William v.
Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331–34 (4th Cir. 2007).
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United States following a wrongful removal order has also surfaced
recently in arguably egregious circumstances: in 2012, the Solicitor
General’s office admitted that it misrepresented agency policy in its brief
before the Supreme Court in a case involving the agency’s policy on
facilitating the return of such individuals.86
Removability implicates the criminal justice system as well.
Immigration-related crimes have become the most heavily prosecuted
federal crimes over the past two decades.87 The penalties for illegal reentry
are harsh, and, depending on the circumstances, sentences can run as high
as twenty years.88 Few defenses to an illegal reentry charge exist.89 But
criminal defense attorneys may employ arguments grounded in
removability issues in order to defend against a charge of illegal reentry,
for instance through a collateral attack on the prior removal order,90 or a
claim of U.S. citizenship.91 Similar arguments may also become critical to
ameliorating the otherwise harsh sentencing scheme associated with illegal
reentry.92 Longer sentences for illegal reentry may depend on the nature of
the removal order previously issued, such as whether the removal order
followed a conviction for an aggravated felony.93 Thus, individuals seeking
to avoid certain sentencing enhancements in the illegal reentry context
may, and often do, argue for a reexamination of the immigration court’s
removability findings.94
86. Letter from Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor Gen., to the Honorable William K.
Suter,
Clerk,
U.S.
Supreme
Court
(Apr.
24,
2012),
available
at
http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/NIPNLG_v_DHS/OSG%20Letter%20
to%20Supreme%20Court,%20Including%20Attachments%20-%20April%2024%202012.pdf; see
also Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the
Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1600, 1600 (2013).
87. Illegal reentry charges were the most frequently charged federal crime in the first half of
fiscal year 2011. See Illegal Reentry Becomes Top Criminal Charge, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE (June 10, 2011), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/251/ (showing upward
trend in rate of prosecution since 1991); see also Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration
Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135 (2009) (discussing and theorizing about the
criminal prosecution of immigration-related offenses); Doug Keller, Re-thinking Illegal Entry and
Re-Entry, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 65 (2012) (critiquing the massive expansion of illegal entry and
illegal reentry prosecutions and analyzing an eighty-year history of immigration offenses).
88. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
89. See Keller, supra note 87, at 115–16 (discussing citizenship claims and collateral attacks
as the only defenses to illegal reentry, both of which “can require time-consuming research”).
90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (providing implicitly for collateral attacks and requiring
(1) exhaustion of administrative remedies, (2) that the underlying proceedings “improperly
deprived” the noncitizen of judicial review, and (3) that “entry of the order was fundamentally
unfair”).
91. See id. § 1326 (requiring alienage for a conviction for illegal reentry).
92. Id. § 1326(b) (imposing twenty-year maximum sentence for one “whose removal was
subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony”).
93. Id.
94. See Koh, supra note 10, at 274–78 (describing dual use of the categorical approach in
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Removability, when properly contested, can thus involve high stakes.
For those who feel—as many do—that deportation deprives one of “all that
makes life worth living,”95 then removability determinations matter. But
little has been written in the immigration law scholarship to present
removability as a unifying theme.
II. COMPLEX REMOVABILITY THROUGH FOUR EMERGING AREAS OF
IMMIGRATION LAW
This Part lays out a narrative of complex removability by describing
four areas of immigration law in which removability is contested, complex,
and evolving. Under this account, the lines around who is removable are
being actively drawn and redrawn by various actors. In the process, the
scope of the government’s removal power is being continuously negotiated
through legal and factual determinations.
Section A addresses the issue of citizenship—in some ways the most
basic dividing line in immigration law—and a jurisdictional bar to the
immigration agency’s enforcement authority. Section B discusses the
problem of lawful residents whose post-entry conduct places them at risk
of removal, with a focus on the categorical approach—the methodology
used by adjudicators to identify the immigration consequences of past
criminal convictions. Section C discusses the constitutional boundaries of
the government’s power to establish removability over persons who might
lack lawful status by focusing on attempts made by noncitizens in removal
proceedings to suppress evidence of alienage. Finally, Section D explores
immigration statuses that confer little more than safety from deportation.
This section focuses on Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA),
a form of administrative discretion that does not equate to permanent, or
even statutorily sanctioned, immigration status, but that prevents the
government from exercising its removal power. The areas of law discussed
in this Part are not exhaustive. Indeed, there are other areas in which
removability is contested in the immigration laws, such as where the
retroactive application of the immigration laws is challenged,96 or where a
prior “conviction” might not exist.97 But the four dimensions of
removability discussed in this Part help illustrate the potentially
complicated nature of removability and provide an initial framework for a
immigration and illegal reentry contexts).
95. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“[Deportation of one who claims to be a
citizen] may result . . . in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living.”).
96. See, e.g., Kate Aschenbrenner, Beyond “Because I Said So”: Reconciling Civil
Retroactivity Analysis in Immigration Cases with a Protective Lenity Principle, 32 REV. LITIG. 147,
175 (2013); Anjum Gupta, Detrimental Reliance on Detrimental Reliance: The Courts’ Conflicting
Standards for the Retroactive Application of New Immigration Laws to Past Acts, RUTGERS L. REV.
COMMENTARIES 1, 1 (2011).
97. See infra note 171.
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conversation about removability.
A. Questioning Basic Distinctions in Immigration Law: Claims to
U.S. Citizenship
Claims to U.S. citizenship among individuals apprehended by
immigration enforcement authorities constitute an initial dimension of
complex removability. At first blush, using U.S. citizenship as a
fundamental dividing line in immigration law seems like a natural and
straightforward framework. But legal and factual complexity can make the
distinction between citizens and noncitizens unclear and unresolved.98 For
starters, citizenship is not visible. It is not necessarily easily verifiable. The
United States does not operate a citizenry database to identify whether a
person is a citizen (much less a lawful resident), as Justice Sonia
Sotomayor confirmed during oral arguments in Arizona v. United States.99
Indeed, the complexity of the law governing citizenship, addressed below,
would preclude a national citizenry database from ever being fully reliable.
As political theorist Judith Shklar has asserted, “There is no notion more
central in politics than citizenship, [yet] none more variable in history, or
contested in theory.”100
The laws governing citizenship in the United States find their origins in
the two theoretical justifications for citizenship in Western philosophy: jus
soli (birthright citizenship) and jus sanguinis (inherited citizenship). The
United States generally follows a jus soli principle, in that pursuant to the
98. For a compelling examination of the implications of an immigration enforcement system
in which meaningful numbers of U.S. citizens have been removed, faced charges of removal, and
been detained by immigration authorities, see Rachel E. Rosenbloom, The Citizenship Line:
Rethinking Immigration Exceptionalism, B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2272827.
99. During a colloquy on the reliability and contents of federal databases used to issue
immigration detainers instructing state and local law enforcement officials to detain individuals
suspected of immigration violations pending federal action, Justice Sotomayor asked, “Well, how
does that database tell you that someone is illegal, as opposed to a citizen?” In response, Solicitor
General Donald Verrilli explained, “[T]here is no reliable way in the database to verify that you are
a citizen, unless you are in the passport database. So you have lots of circumstances in which people
who are citizens are going to come up [with] no match.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 65:13–
67:5, Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012) (No. 11-182), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-182.pdf.
100. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 1 (1991); see also
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY MEMBERSHIP 17 (2006)
(describing citizenship as “highly enigmatic” and “highly fragmented, if not incoherent”); ROGERS
M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 1 (1997) (arguing
that “through most of U.S. history, lawmakers pervasively and unapologetically structured U.S.
citizenship in terms of illiberal and undemocratic racial, ethnic, and gender hierarchies, for reasons
rooted in basic, enduring imperatives of political life”). To be sure, the academic literature on
citizenship’s contested nature—including the unequal access of certain groups to full citizenship
and the disconnect between citizenship as status and citizenship as political or social identity—is
both vast and beyond the scope of this Article.
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Fourteenth Amendment, all persons born in the United States are
citizens.101 Many noncitizens also acquire citizenship through
naturalization, a relatively straightforward administrative process that
usually involves meeting certain residence and good moral character
requirements.102 The naturalization process exemplifies the standard
citizenship narrative, in which immigrants “come to this country, take up
residence, and eventually obtain full membership rights, represented in the
grant of citizenship status.”103
However, not all U.S. citizens come from the standard narrative. Jus
sanguinis principles have also influenced certain statutory provisions that
govern citizenship and can lead to individuals being U.S. citizens through
their parents, sometimes unknowingly. Under the general rules of
“acquired” citizenship, individuals who are born abroad to at least one U.S.
citizen and who meet other statutory criteria104 are deemed to automatically
acquire citizenship at birth.105 About 2.5 million U.S. residents appear to
have acquired citizenship at birth abroad.106 A similar principle governs the
children of those who naturalize. A foreign-born child can obtain “derived”
citizenship if at least one parent naturalizes before the child turns eighteen
and meets other statutory criteria.107 Acquired and derivative citizenship
rules confer citizenship by operation of law, even if the individual is
unaware of their U.S. citizenship status or lacks documentary proof of it.108
U.S. citizenship acts as a complete defense to allegations lodged by ICE
because the immigration agency has no jurisdiction over U.S. citizens.109 In
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside.”).
102. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2012) (describing requirements for naturalization).
103. Pham, supra note 41, at 1161 (citing T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Ruben G. Rumbaut,
Terms of Belonging: Are Models of Membership Self-Fulfilling Prophecies?, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
1, 1 (1998)).
104. These statutory criteria have changed over time and reflect gender preferences that the
courts have upheld. See infra notes 142–50 and accompanying text.
105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(c)–(h); see also David A. Isaacson, Correcting Anomalies in the
United States Law of Citizenship by Descent, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 313, 322–27 (2005) (describing
relevant statutory provisions); Lee J. Terán, Mexican Children of U.S. Citizens: “Viges Prin” and
Other Tales of Challenges to Asserting Acquired U.S. Citizenship, 14 SCHOLAR 583, 607–20 (2012)
(explaining acquired citizenship, including changes to acquired citizenship statutes over time).
106. See B05001: Citizenship Status in the United States: Universe: Total Population in the
United States 2010 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_10_1YR_
B05001&prodType=table (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
107. See 8 U.S.C. § 1433(a).
108. See, e.g., United States v. Smith-Baltiher, 424 F.3d 913, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Smith
was entitled to U.S. citizenship, along with its rights and privileges, from the moment of birth, not
upon the issuance of a certificate of citizenship or any other formal determination by the INS or any
other governmental official.”).
109. The stated policy of ICE is to “ensure claims to U.S. citizenship receive immediate and
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order to establish removability, the government must prove alienage, i.e.,
that the individual being targeted for removal is not a citizen of the United
States.110 U.S. citizenship should insulate an individual from related
immigration sanctions such as detention.111 Citizenship is particularly
critical to individuals who the immigration agency alleges are “criminal
aliens.”112 Because acquired and derivative citizenship claims confer
citizenship by operation of law (typically, as of the date the child was born
or the date that the parent naturalized), citizenship may also exist
regardless of whether the individual has a prior criminal conviction that
would make an alien removable. Thus, some people who are neither born
in the United States nor have directly applied for naturalization nonetheless
are citizens, even though the immigration agency may allege that they are
“criminal aliens” or not lawfully present. One survey of immigration
detainees in a New York City facility found that eight percent had
potential, not-yet-litigated claims to citizenship.113
The harshness of the immigration and criminal laws make citizenship
claims particularly high-stakes matters. The immigration laws bar most
noncitizens from eligibility for relief from removal if they have been
convicted of an aggravated felony.114 Illegal reentry charges often follow
for individuals who live in the United States but have been legally barred
from doing so through removal orders.115 Citizenship offers one of the few
defenses to an illegal reentry charge.116 Thus, the results of one’s claim to
U.S. citizenship may carry monumental consequences for the individual.
Despite the seemingly clear legal rules designed to prevent the
detention and deportation of U.S. citizens, news reports of this very
occurrence have surfaced with troubling frequency over the past decade.117
careful investigation and analysis.” See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y,
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to Field Office Directors, et al., at 1 (Nov. 19, 2009),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/usc_guidance_nov_2009.pdf (“As a
matter of law, ICE cannot assert its civil immigration enforcement authority to arrest and/or detain a
[U.S. citizen].”).
110. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2013).
111. See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 109, at 1.
112. See 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (providing for the expedited removal of criminal aliens); 8 C.F.R.
§ 238.1 (same).
113. CITY BAR JUSTICE CTR., N.Y.C. BAR ASS’N, NYC KNOW YOUR RIGHTS PROJECT: AN
INNOVATIVE PRO BONO RESPONSE TO THE LACK OF COUNSEL FOR INDIGENT IMMIGRANT DETAINEES 8,
12 (Nov. 2009), http://www2.nycbar.org/citybarjusticecenter/pdf/NYC_KnowYourRightsNov09
.pdf (noting that, in a sample of 158 detainees, 8% were eligible for relief due to derivative
citizenship).
114. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 73, § 71.05[2][c].
115. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
116. See supra note 89–92 and accompanying text.
117. See Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S.
Citizens as Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 637 (2011) (noting the beginning of media
reporting in 2008 on the detention of U.S. citizens by ICE). Furthermore, data obtained from ICE
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A study conducted by political scientist Professor Jacqueline Stevens
estimates that at least one percent of individuals detained by ICE and
facing potential removal had claims to U.S. citizenship that were ultimately
affirmed by an IJ.118 Professor Stevens notes that, while one percent may
seem like an insignificant number, over time the result may plausibly be
that “since 2003, ICE has incarcerated over 20,000 U.S. citizens, and
deported thousands more.”119 These numbers do not include those who do
not pursue their claims,120 or whose claims are colorable but nonetheless
unsuccessful. The deportation and detention of U.S. citizens appear to take
place notwithstanding statutory121 and regulatory protections,122 as well as
agency policy,123 that seem aimed at preventing the erroneous removal of
citizens.124
Examining both the factual complexity and the legal complexity
associated with claims to citizenship can shed light on why arguably
excessive numbers of U.S. citizens may have been subject to ICE’s
enforcement powers in recent years. The factual complexity associated
with claims to citizenship has several dimensions. First, as noted earlier,
citizenship may not be immediately ascertainable. Most citizens do not
carry their birth certificates or passports,125 and cannot produce them
through the Freedom of Information Act indicates that, over a fifty-month period from fiscal year
2008 through the beginning of fiscal year 2012, 834 U.S. citizens were issued “detainers” by ICE—
that is, notices given by ICE to local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to temporarily
detain individuals based on suspected immigration law violations. See Who Are the Targets of ICE
Detainers?, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://www.trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/310.
118. Stevens’s estimate only includes those individuals who pursued their citizenship claims in
immigration court, not those with potential claims that were not pursued. Stevens, supra note 117,
at 629.
119. Id. at 630.
120. Id. at 629 (“[A]nother .05% of those detained at the border or in an ICE facility who sign
removal orders and are physically removed are U.S. citizens.”).
121. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(7)(B) (2012) (providing for de novo review of removal
orders where a claim of U.S. nationality is made). By contrast, the INA forecloses judicial review of
many removal orders, particular where no constitutional or legal question exists. See generally id.
§ 1252(a)(2).
122. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5) (2013) (requiring claims to citizenship to be referred to
an immigration court for full hearing, even where the case was initially processed for expedited
removal order at the border).
123. See Memorandum from John Morton, supra note 109, at 1.
124. See also Terán, supra note 105, at 591 (“[I]t is not uncommon that children born abroad
to U.S. parents are deported or removed from the United States, sometimes repeatedly, despite the
fact that they are U.S. citizens.” (footnote omitted)).
125. Although there is empirical data on the number of citizens who do not have ready access
to their birth certificates or passports, see infra note 127, whether most citizens do not carry their
birth certificates or passports—while intuitive—is usually simply asserted by those discussing the
issue. See Kenia Acevedo, Comment, Exploitative Framings: How Laws and Human Rights
Violations in Mexico Are Being Used to Justify S.B. 1070, 31 CHICANA/O-LATINA/O L. REV. 75, 85
(2012) (asserting that most U.S. citizens do not carry passports); Serge Egelman & Lorrie Faith
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during immigration enforcement actions that take place within the United
States, such as during workplace raids or criminal arrests.126 Some people,
including citizens, do not own either type of document.127 Mental illness
and poverty may compound the inability to prove, on the spot, one’s
citizenship. As noted, some individuals may be citizens without knowing
it, due to the rules governing acquired and derivative citizenship. Alas, one
study found that over a fifty-month period from 2008 through 2012, 834
persons later found to be U.S. citizens had been temporarily detained by
local law enforcement authorities acting at the direction of ICE.128
Examples have surfaced in which individuals have presented, or
potentially could have presented, valid proof of citizenship in the form of
birth certificates, passports, and affidavits, and yet still were unable to
persuade the agency of the merits of their claims.129 One of the more wellpublicized cases involves Mark Lyttle, who was a U.S. citizen by birth
with no ties to Mexico, did not speak Spanish, and yet was ordered
removed three times by agency officials.130 According to a complaint filed
by Lyttle for his wrongful deportation, Lyttle had ample evidence of his
U.S. citizenship–including a social security number, his mother’s name,
sworn statements, and criminal background checks–and was still processed
by immigration enforcement authorities and ultimately ordered to be

Cranor, The Real ID Act: Fixing Identity Documents with Duct Tape, 2 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO.
SOC’Y 149, 149 (2006) (same); Renata Robertson, Note, The Right to Court-Appointed Counsel in
Removal Proceedings: An End to Wrongful Detention and Deportation of U.S. Citizens, 15
SCHOLAR 567, 572 (citing Andrew Becker, Observe and Deport, MOTHER JONES (Apr. 23, 2009,
8:35 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/04/observe-and-deport (asserting that most
U.S. citizens do not carry passports or birth certificates)); Policy Brief on Proof of Citizenship,
BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. (Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/
analysis/Proof%20of%20Citizenship.pdf (noting that “[m]any people believe that all Americans
have readily available documents that prove their citizenship” and asserting that “Americans who
have [birth certificates, naturalization certificates, or passports] do not usually carry it around with
them”).
126. See generally Anil Kalhan, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Implications of Interior
Immigration Enforcement, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1137, 1149–68 (2008) (describing expanded
interior enforcement efforts in immigration).
127. See Citizens Without Proof: A Survey of Americans’ Possession of Documentary Proof of
Citizenship and Photo Identification, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUST. 2 (Nov. 2006),
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_39242.pdf (estimating that
as many as thirteen million U.S. citizens may not have ready access to documentary proof of
citizenship).
128. See Who Are the Targets of ICE Detainers?, supra note 117.
129. See Stevens, supra note 117, at 654–82 (discussing examples of U.S. citizens deported
and detained).
130. See Stevens, supra note 117, at 674–76 (describing the Mark Lyttle case); see also
William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29, 2013, at 24, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/04/29/130429fa_fact_finnegan (subscription required)
(describing the Mark Lyttle case).
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removed.131
Second, in these cases, removability can depend as much on the legal
strength of an individual’s claims as on how the immigration agency
responds to the citizenship claim raised by individuals in immigration
detention. A strong pro-enforcement culture at ICE seems to be obscuring
citizenship claims, including even otherwise legally clear claims to
citizenship. The reality is that for someone in immigration detention,
making a citizenship claim can be a high-risk proposition. Detainees with
potential claims to citizenship have been threatened by ICE officials with
the possibility of criminal prosecution should they insist that they are U.S.
citizens.132 The risk is compounded by the invisibility of citizenship. As
Professor Stevens notes, “[I]ndividuals in ICE custody who are U.S.
citizens but have not had their claims legally recognized at first inspection
are impossible to distinguish from noncitizens making false claims to U.S.
citizenship.”133 That at least some detainees with citizenship claims are
threatened with accusations of fraud serves as one data point to suggest
that some number of frontline agency officials are simply not taking claims
to citizenship seriously.134 Thus, the governmental bureaucracy has been
unable to adequately recognize citizenship claims and incorporate them
into the current enforcement framework.
Third, the practical barriers that accompany physical detention by ICE
present another dimension of the factual complexity associated with claims
to citizenship. Detained individuals cannot easily retrieve proof of
citizenship.135 What might have been relatively straightforward efforts to
establish citizenship have been thwarted by the fact that immigration
detainees have no right to government-appointed counsel, are often
detained far away from family and friends, and lack access to legal
resources.136 In cases involving acquired or derivative claims to
citizenship, sometimes critical documentary evidence is needed to
corroborate factual circumstances from the past, such as proof of adoption
131. Complaint at 10–11, 14, Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (M.D. Ga. 2012)
(No. 4:11-cv-142).
132. Criminal liability for asserting that one is a citizen could come from the illegal reentry
statute at 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (2012) (in civil removal cases that have not yet entered the criminal
justice system) and the federal crime of false personation of a U.S. citizen at 18 U.S.C. § 911. See
Stevens, supra note 117, at 677–82 (discussing the example of Mario Guerrero, who was born in
Mexico but acquired U.S. citizenship at birth through his U.S. citizen father, and was criminally
prosecuted on two separate occasions for immigration-related crimes, one of which included falsely
impersonating a U.S. citizen).
133. Stevens, supra note 117, at 628–29.
134. See id. at 654–82 (discussing the response of DHS agents to claims of U.S. citizenship).
135. See IMMIGRANT LEGAL RES. CTR., NATURALIZATION AND U.S. CITIZENSHIP: THE ESSENTIAL
LEGAL GUIDE § 12.5 (11th ed. 2011) (discussing documentation required for certain acquired
citizenship claims and noting that obtaining documentary proof, such as proof of parents’ U.S.
citizenship status or proof of past residence, may be extremely difficult).
136. See Kalhan, supra note 78, at 46–47; Stevens, supra note 117, at 680–81.
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from a distant year. In such cases, obtaining the evidence requires
navigating multiple governmental bureaucracies. Thus, the more
complicated claims to citizenship remain undeveloped due to the practical
difficulties of obtaining specific evidence.
Factual challenges to obtaining proof of citizenship have arisen on a
broader scale as well. For many years prior to 2009, the Department of
State had an agency-wide practice of denying U.S. passports to individuals
born along the Texas–Mexico border by midwives, due to concern that
since the 1960s, midwives had forged the birth certificates of certain
Mexican individuals in order to facilitate immigration fraud.137 The State
Department’s routine denial of passports ultimately ended after a lawsuit in
the late 2000s alleged that the practice amounted to ethnic and national
origin discrimination.138 But the litigation serves as yet another example of
the potentially unsettled nature of citizenship as well as the government’s
role in either facilitating or foreclosing these claims.
Beyond factual complexity, the substantive laws governing citizenship
are sufficiently complicated that it sometimes takes federal court
intervention to adjudicate citizenship. Determining which statutory criteria
apply as a threshold matter may require significant research, because the
law at the time of the child’s birth determines the relevant criteria and the
statutes have changed frequently over time.139 Questions over the meaning
of those statutory criteria have also become subject to debate amongst
appellate courts. Certain versions of the federal statutes require an
individual claiming acquired or derivative citizenship to prove the legal
nature of their relationship to the U.S. citizen parent, for instance by
showing that the citizen parent “legitimated” a child born out of wedlock
or that the citizen parent had “custody” over the child.140 These claims
often rest on state law treatment of legitimation or paternity.141 Courts have
137. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, State Department Agrees to Fair
Issuance of Passports to Mexican Americans (June 26, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/
state-department-agrees-fair-issuance-passports-mexican-americans.
138. See Complaint at 3, Castelano v. Rice, No. 7:08-cv-00057 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 16, 2008). The
lawsuit was settled in 2009 with the State Department agreeing to implement new procedures for
the processing of passport applications by affected class members. See Press Release, American
Civil Liberties Union, supra note 137.
139. See Sepulveda, 14 I. & N. Dec. 616, 617 (B.I.A. 1974); see also Keller, supra note 87, at
116 (“Determining whether someone has a potential derivative-citizenship defense may involve
significant legal research into the changing derivative citizenship requirements and factual research
into the defendant’s history.”).
140. See, e.g., Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 2012) (determining that the
citizenship of an individual charged with removal would be determined if his U.S. citizen father’s
“paternity . . . [was] established while [he was] under the age of twenty-one years by legitimation,”
as required by the 1952 version of immigration statutes (alterations in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1409(a) (1952)).
141. See id. (using state law to decide legitimation). When the realities of transnational
migration are taken into account—in which records may be unavailable or border crossings

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 4

1828

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

thus navigated the intersection of family and immigration law in response
to claims raised by individuals affected at the crossroads of criminal and
immigration law.
Other citizenship cases have reached the federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, through equal protection-based challenges to an explicit
gender preference in the acquired citizenship statute, in which the
provision governing individuals with only one U.S. citizen parent favors
the children of U.S. citizen mothers over U.S. citizen fathers.142 Although
the gender dimension of the cases has attracted the attention of scholars,143
the role of these cases in the growing landscape of removal defense and the
convergence of criminal and immigration laws has gone generally
unnoticed.144 Take, for instance, the Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in
Nguyen v. INS.145 The opinion dealt primarily with the legitimacy of the
gender classifications in the immigration laws. Commentators have
critiqued the gender equality principles set forth in Nguyen.146 But an
examination of the facts leading Tuan Nguyen to pursue his citizenship
claim makes clear that Nguyen was very much a removal defense case
about whom the government had jurisdiction to deport. Nguyen lived in the
United States since age six.147 Despite his strong ties to the country, he was
frequent—then demonstrating that an individual meets statutory rules involving physical presence
or parental custody arrangements may become factually complex as well.
142. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 56–57, 73 (2001); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424
(1998); United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an equally divided
court, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2012) (per curiam).
143. See, e.g., M. Isabel Medina, Real Differences and Stereotypes—Two Visions of Gender,
Citizenship, and International Law, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 315, 316–19 (2004) (critiquing the cases);
Laura Weinrib, Protecting Sex: Sexual Disincentives and Sex-Based Discrimination in Nguyen v.
INS, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 222, 223–24 (2003) (same).
144. A growing literature on the convergence of the immigration and criminal laws has
emerged over the past decade. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented:
Ironic Boundaries of the Post-September 11th “Pale of Law,” 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG.
639, 651–55 (2004) (discussing criminalization of noncitizens after September 11th and through
proposals to involve local law enforcement in immigration enforcement); Stephen H. Legomsky,
The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 472 (2007) (asserting that immigration law has adopted criminal law’s
punitive aspects while rejecting criminal law’s procedural protections); Peter L. Markowitz,
Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 1301 (2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court
has rejected, and may further reject, traditional characterizations of deportation as purely civil in
nature); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (exploring the convergence of criminal and immigration laws, as
well as the implications of convergence for political theories of national membership).
145. 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
146. See Medina, supra note 143, at 333–44, 344 (discussing gender stereotypes reflected in
Nguyen and observing that “[t]he Nguyen case embraces a view of gender and citizenship at odds
with the Court’s own legal norms of gender equality”); Weinrib, supra note 143, at 226 (asserting
that Nguyen “is, fundamentally, a case about sex”).
147. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 57.
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rendered ineligible for discretionary relief in the aftermath of the 1996
immigration laws,148 which made his claim to citizenship essential if he
wished to remain in the United States. Ruben Flores-Villar’s situation was
similar to Nguyen’s. Flores-Villar’s equal protection-based challenge to
the citizenship provision setting forth different requirements for the
children of U.S. citizen mothers versus fathers was rejected by the
Supreme Court in 2011.149 The case had attracted the amicus support of
various organizations and individuals that emphasized that the survival of
the citizenship statutes had been premised on outdated gender
stereotypes.150 But Flores-Villar, like Nguyen, was an alleged “criminal
alien.”151 He pursued his citizenship claim as a defense to criminal
prosecution for illegal reentry.152 Acquired and derivative citizenship
claims have thus constituted sites in which racialized and gendered
hierarchies have been negotiated.153 But they have also served as
mechanisms through which individuals have gone from one end of the
“citizen-alien” spectrum to the other: from “criminal aliens” subject to
criminal sanction to U.S. citizens immune from civil and criminal
immigration-related enforcement authority.
This is not to suggest that citizenship is always, or even mostly, plagued
by factual and legal uncertainty. Admittedly, citizenship is clear for many
individuals. But where the claims are not clear—and where the human
stakes are arguably highest—the level of factual and legal complexity runs
deep and has meaningful consequences that go to the heart of the
government’s immigration enforcement power. Citizenship claims thus
illustrate how removability matters, how it is complicated, and how
148. Nguyen had come to the U.S. at age six as a lawful permanent resident, and was raised in
the United States by his U.S. citizen father. Id. After sixteen years of living in the United States, he
pled guilty to two criminal charges that the INS characterized as both aggravated felonies and
crimes involving moral turpitude. Id. By the time of his appeal to the BIA, he had lived in the
United States for twenty-two years. Id.
149. Albeit, the Court was equally divided due to Justice Elena Kagan recusing herself. FloresVillar v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (2011) (per curiam), aff’g by an equally divided court, 536
F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2008).
150. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Equality Now et al. in Support of Petitioner at 1–2,
Flores-Villar, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (No. 09-5801), 2010 WL 2602011, at *1–2; Brief of the National
Women’s Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Flores-Villar, 131 S. Ct.
2312 (No. 09-5801), 2010 WL 2602010, at *2; Brief Amici Curiae of Professors of History,
Political Science, and Law in Support of Petitioner at 1–3, Flores-Villar, 131 S. Ct. 2312 (No. 095801), 2010 WL 2602009. For further background on the historians’ amicus brief in Flores-Villar,
see Kristin A. Collins, A Short History of Sex and Citizenship: The Historians’ Amicus Brief in
Flores-Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1485 (2011).
151. See United States v. Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by an equally
divided court, 131 S. Ct. 2312.
152. Id.
153. As noted, the Supreme Court issued an equally divided opinion that affirmed, without
opinion, the Ninth Circuit’s ruling that had rejected Flores-Villar’s equal protection arguments. See
Flores-Villar, 131 S. Ct. 2312; Flores-Villar, 536 F.3d 990.
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outcomes in citizenship claims may depend just as much on the
government’s actions—in responding to individual claims, in imposing
difficulties to obtaining proof, or in construing the law—as on the merits of
the individual’s claim. As the next sections show, citizenship claims
represent only one dimension of complex removability.
B. The Categorical Approach and the Immigration
Consequences of Crime
In some cases, removability inquiries focus on preventing the loss of
status caused by post-entry conduct, as opposed to proving that one has
status (as in the citizenship context). The legal complexity surrounding the
immigration consequences of crime serves as a second lens for examining
complex removability. The intersection of criminal and immigration
laws154 has grown with such force in recent years that in 2010, in Padilla v.
Kentucky,155 the Supreme Court recognized that deportation caused by
criminal convictions is “intimately related to the criminal process”156 and
held that criminal defense attorneys have an ethical obligation to correctly
advise noncitizen defendants of the immigration consequences of a guilty
plea.157 In Padilla, Justice Samuel Alito concurred in the judgment that
criminal defense counsel who affirmatively mislead their clients have
breached an ethical duty, but criticized the majority’s holding that criminal
lawyers also have an obligation to correctly advise their clients on the
relationship between deportation and a guilty plea.158 Notably for purposes
of this Article, in criticizing the majority, Justice Alito asserted that
identifying the immigration consequences of crime “is often quite
complex” and “not an easy task.”159 Indeed, determining whether a given
criminal conviction triggers an immigration sanction can require extensive
analysis of criminal and immigration statutes, prior case law, and the
criminal record of conviction. The assessment cannot be made quickly, or
with obvious answers.
The immigration laws have long provided for adverse immigration
consequences based on the existence of a past criminal conviction.
However, the INA (like other federal immigration laws before it) does not
contain a list of every criminal statute that leads to immigration
154. See supra note 144.
155. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
156. Id. at 1481.
157. Id. at 1486.
158. Id. at 1487 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
159. Id. at 1488; see also Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012) (citing
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Padilla regarding the complexity of removability determinations).
Although this Article uses Justice Alito’s concurrence to discuss the categorical approach, the view
of complex removability in this Article does not necessarily endorse Justice Alito’s call to limit the
holding of Padilla to cases of affirmative misadvice by criminal defense counsel. See also supra
note 31.
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penalties.160 Instead, the grounds of inadmissibility or deportability
describe the crimes in categorical terms by employing statutory terms of art
such as “crime[s] involving moral turpitude”161 and “crime[s] of
violence,”162 or by referencing common law crimes such as “theft,”163
“burglary,”164 and others.165 Without a statute specifying precisely which
crimes lead to removability, the administrative agencies and courts must
have some system for determining the immigration consequences of crime.
For over a century, adjudicators have used the categorical approach to
assess whether a particular conviction triggers removability and other
immigration sanctions.166
As a threshold matter, the conviction must rise to the level of a
removable offense.167 For noncitizens facing deportation, the government
has the burden of proving that the noncitizen is removable—in other
words, that the criminal conviction falls within a particular ground of
deportability.168 For noncitizens facing denial of admission on criminalbased grounds, the noncitizens faces the burden of showing that the
conviction does not constitute a basis for inadmissibility,169 although the
arguments presented in the deportability and inadmissibility contexts may
be similar.170 Thus, if it cannot be established that the noncitizen’s
conviction falls within the relevant grounds of inadmissibility or
deportability, then removability comes into question.171 In some cases, the
160. In addition to permanent deportation, immigration consequences of crime may include
mandatory detention during the pendency of removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012), bars
on discretionary relief from deportation, see, e.g., id. § 1229b(b)(1), and bars to eligibility for
immigration benefits such as acquiring lawful status, see, e.g., id. § 1255(a) (stating that adjustment
of status is only available if the “alien . . . is admissible,” which the alien may not be if he or she has
committed a crime).
161. Id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (referencing but not defining “crime[s] involving moral turpitude”).
162. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (cross-referencing 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) for the definition of “crime
of violence”).
163. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(G).
164. Id.
165. E.g., id. § 1101(a)(43) (describing types of aggravated felonies); id. § 1182(a)(2)(C)
(defining as inadmissible aliens who commit controlled substance offenses).
166. Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1673–74 (2011). For a discussion on the
historical use of the categorical approach in immigration cases, see id. at 1688–1702.
167. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2).
168. Id. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (placing burden on government to prove deportability by “clear and
convincing evidence”).
169. See id. § 1229a(c)(2)(A).
170. See, e.g., Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2011) (hearing petition of
a noncitizen seeking termination of removal proceedings based on the argument that convictions did
not trigger grounds of inadmissibility as crimes involving moral turpitude under categorical or
modified categorical approaches).
171. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (defining “removable” as either inadmissible or
deportable). The noncitizen can seek other methods for contesting removability based on prior
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availability of discretionary relief is irrelevant because the adjudicator must
terminate the removal proceedings, absent any additional grounds of
removability.172 In other cases, the type of removability established may
definitively bar the individual from applying for discretionary relief.173
Like an intricate matching exercise, the essence of the categorical
approach requires adjudicators to analyze the immigration consequences of
a criminal conviction by scrutinizing at least two sets of statutes: (1) the
federal immigration provision describing the removable offense, and
(2) the particular criminal statute under which the noncitizen was
convicted.174 Various rules govern this matching exercise.175 Significantly,
the categorical approach—as historically understood—avoids inquiry into
the factual circumstances behind the conviction.176 To the extent that the
categorical approach allows factual evidence to affect the determination,
extra-statutory evidence is strictly limited to a specific list of documents
from the criminal case known as the “record of conviction.”177 The
convictions other than invoking categorical approach arguments. For instance, the noncitizen might
argue that the offense does not meet the statutory definition of a “conviction” under the INA,
although doing so can present formidable challenges because Congress broadened the definition in
1996. Saleh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing the “consistent broadening of
the meaning of ‘conviction’ in the INA,” particularly the expansion by Congress in 1996); see also
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (defining a “conviction” for immigration purposes). Another possibility
would involve seeking relief through state law, such as by a post-conviction vacation or even a
gubernatorial pardon. These areas of law, like the others discussed in this Article, involve a
significant degree of complexity. See Jason A. Cade, Deporting the Pardoned, 46 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 355, 384–85 (2012) (noting limitations on the use of pardons and other “back-end processes”
to preclude immigration consequences of convictions); Andrew Moore, Criminal Deportation,
Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 665 (2008)
(critiquing the BIA rule that only permits immigration relief where plea was vacated to correct
procedural or substantive deficiencies in criminal process).
172. See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (2010) (holding that the alien
was not removable and thus not reaching the issue of discretionary relief); see also supra note 11.
In many cases, a successful argument under the categorical approach is necessary in order to
maintain eligibility for discretionary relief. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (making an aggravated
felony a disqualifying factor for cancellation of removal); Carachuri-Rosendo, 130 S. Ct. at 2580
(holding that the alien’s crime was not an aggravated felony and thus the alien remained eligible for
discretionary relief).
173. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“Any alien who is convicted of an aggravated
felony at any time after admission is deportable.”), with id. § 1229b(a). Some courts have also held
that respondents seeking discretionary relief have the burden of proving that their convictions do
not constitute aggravated felonies or other crimes that would disqualify them for relief. See, e.g.,
Young v. Holder, 697 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
174. See Koh, supra note 10, at 266–67 (explaining the basic rules of the categorical
approach).
175. Id.
176. Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting Categorical
Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1688–97 (2011) (discussing the historical
prohibition on considering extra-record factual evidence).
177. Cf. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (defining the “record of conviction”
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categorical approach is thus comprised of a series of rules, or steps, that
adjudicators must follow in order to reach the substantive decision as to
whether a crime leads to a range of immigration consequences, including
removability.178 While the categorical approach can cut both ways for the
noncitizen—since it shields inquiry into both good and bad facts—I have
argued elsewhere that the categorical approach generally favors noncitizens
and should be preserved in its most robust form.179
Cases involving the categorical approach have grown extraordinarily
complex, both in identifying the rules of the categorical approach and in
applying them. Indeed, an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals—which has the second largest volume of immigration cases in the
country180— suggested in 2011 that “over the past decade, perhaps no other
area of the law has demanded more of our resources.”181 And in the midst
of increasing litigation, the categorical approach has become controversial
and arguably confusing.182 Inter- and intra-circuit disagreement and
inconsistency over the categorical approach are now common,183 as are
sharp differences between the federal judiciary and the administrative
immigration agencies over the categorical approach’s application.184 Some
courts have criticized the categorical approach as counterfactual and
under the categorical approach of the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 as “limited to the terms
of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge
and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some
comparable judicial record of this information”).
178. See Koh, supra note 10, at 278–95 (dividing the categorical approach into four main
stages of analysis).
179. Id. at 279, 294.
180. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics: March 31, 2012,
CTS.
34
(Mar.
31,
2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
U.S.
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2012/tables/B07Mar12.pdf (noting that of the 1,716 immigration
offense cases heard by the U.S. courts of appeals, the Ninth Circuit had 447 cases, behind the Fifth
Circuit’s 880 and ahead of the Eleventh Circuit’s 106).
181. United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(citing numerous en banc cases in the Ninth Circuit), abrogated on other grounds by Young v.
Holder, 697 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276
(2013); see also Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 180, at 30–34 (noting that of the
8,082 cases appealed to the Ninth Circuit, 447, or over 25% of criminal cases, were for immigration
offenses).
182. See, e.g., Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2299 (2009) (observing that “the
categorical method is not always easy to apply”); Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 148 (3d Cir.
2004) (characterizing its categorical approach jurisprudence as “not a seamless web”).
183. See, e.g., Singh, 383 F.3d at 148; Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 923–24 (intracircuit); id. at 931 (inter-circuit).
184. See Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693, 695 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008) (“Although to
date the Department generally has deferred to the relevant circuit court in deciding which approach
to use in a given case, providing a consistent, authoritative, nationwide method for interpreting and
applying ambiguous provisions of the immigration laws . . . is one of the Department’s key
duties.”).
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counterintuitive,185 because it forbids adjudicators from weighing factual
allegations. One scholar compared the categorical approach to property
law’s rule against perpetuities in terms of its complexity, and noted that
“[e]ven lawyers who regularly practice [in the area] can struggle to
understand the doctrine and its occasionally perplexing results.”186
Similarly, federal appeals courts’ treatment of aspects of the categorical
approach has been described as “a bit of a jumble,” “ambiguous,”
“conflicting,” and “reflecting . . . stop-and-start analysis.”187 From the
immigration enforcement agency’s perspective, the categorical approach at
times makes it more difficult to establish removability, and does so in a
manner that seems to rest on the wording of statutes or the contents of
criminal court documents.188
Two broader factors seem to have increased litigation related to the
categorical approach in the federal courts of appeal. First, for noncitizens
facing deportation due to criminal conviction, pursuing arguments under
the categorical approach is often the only viable legal strategy—either to
contest removability altogether or to qualify for discretionary relief.189 Due
to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA),190 convictions considered “aggravated felonies” completely
bar even the possibility of most forms of discretionary relief.191 Second,
those same laws drastically expand the kinds of crimes that constitute
removable offenses.192 It has thus become extremely common for ICE to
allege that relatively minor offenses, like shoplifting, nonetheless carry the
draconian result of permanent banishment from the country with no
opportunity for discretionary relief.193 A number of criminal sentencing
185. E.g., Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 151 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) (criticizing
possible “untoward consequences” of the categorical approach under the Armed Career Criminal
Act); Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging the categorical
approach’s “[c]ounterfactual and counterintuitive” nature); Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1076
(9th Cir. 2008) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s “counter-intuitive holding”
that a hit-and-run statute does not involve a crime involving moral turpitude); see also Mary
Holper, The New Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1301
(2011) (“Some courts have questioned the [categorical] approach as unduly formulaic, as [it]
requires the immigration judge to put on blinders as to what ‘really happened.’” (citing MonteroUbri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319, 321 (1st Cir. 2000) and United States v. Miller, 478 F.3d 48, 52 (1st
Cir. 2007))).
186. Doug Keller, Causing Mischief for Taylor’s Categorical Approach: Applying “Legal
Imagination” to Duenas-Alvarez, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625, 625 (2011).
187. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 931.
188. Cf. Koh, supra note 10, at 261–62.
189. See id. at 269–70.
190. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
191. See 6 GORDON ET AL., supra note 73, § 71.05(2)(c).
192. See Das, supra note 166, at 1672.
193. See, e.g., Viveiros v. Holder, 692 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that DHS had asserted
that shoplifting was a crime of moral turpitude).
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statutes also give rise to the categorical approach, and the categorical
approach in the sentencing context has likewise been the subject of
frequent and intense litigation.194 The prominence of the categorical
approach at the intersection of the criminal and immigration laws cannot
be overstated.
Over the past decade, as the courts have responded to the 1996
immigration laws, they have slowly (statute-by-statute) redefined the
precise reach of those laws.195 The Supreme Court has clarified, for
instance, that one-time drug possession,196 a second drug possession (most
of the time),197 and certain D.U.I.198 convictions do not constitute
aggravated felonies. Since 1996, the federal appeals courts have analyzed
countless state criminal statutes to identify their immigration
consequences.199 Much of the complexity associated with the categorical
approach arises from the methodology itself, which involves a detailed,
sometimes painstaking examination of immigration law as well as state
case law.200
An additional layer of complexity arises because the categorical
approach itself is undergoing fluctuation and change, both in the core
features and in the finer details of the approach’s application. In the past
five years in particular, some courts and administrative adjudicators have
taken significant steps to dilute the categorical approach’s core features, at
times in radical ways.201 For instance, in 2008 and 2009, former Attorney
General Michael Mukasey and the Supreme Court issued decisions in
Silva-Trevino202 and Nijhawan v. Holder,203 respectively, that suggested
that one of the fundamental features of the categorical approach—the
prohibition on relitigating the facts of the criminal trial in later criminal

194. See Keller, supra note 186, at 625; Sarah French Russell, Rethinking Recidivist
Enhancements: The Role of Prior Drug Convictions in Federal Sentencing, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1135, 1146–48 (2010).
195. See Das, supra note 166, at 1673 (“A New York drug conviction may or may not be an
‘illicit trafficking’ aggravated felony. A California assault conviction may or may not be a ‘crime
involving moral turpitude.’” (footnote omitted)).
196. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50–52 (2006).
197. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577, 2580 (2010).
198. Leocal v. Ashcroft 543 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2004).
199. See United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011) (“In the
twenty years since Taylor, we have struggled to understand the contours of the Supreme Court’s
[categorical and modified categorical] framework[s]. Indeed, over the past decade, perhaps no other
area of the law has demanded more of our resources.”), abrogated on other grounds by Young v.
Holder, 697 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276
(2013).
200. See Koh, supra note 10, at 278–79.
201. Id. at 278–94.
202. 24 I. & N. Dec. 687 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008).
203. 557 U.S. 29 (2009).
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proceedings—need not apply in all cases.204 As immigration law professor
Alina Das has shown, Silva-Trevino and Nijhawan contravened nearly one
hundred years of immigration precedent.205 This trend, while rejected by
several courts of appeal,206 nonetheless shows that government authorities
have set forth substantially different views of the categorical approach.
In 2013, the Supreme Court issued a pair of decisions, Moncrieffe v.
Holder207 and Descamps v. United States,208 which appear to have
reinvigorated the categorical approach. While the Court’s holding in
Moncrieffe clarified that possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
was not an aggravated felony for immigration purposes,209 the Court
repeatedly emphasized that the categorical approach should focus on
statutory analysis over factual investigation.210 Moncrieffe gives rise to
strong arguments that further weaken the holding of Silva-Trevino.211
Similarly, in Descamps, a criminal sentencing case that raised categorical
approach questions salient to immigration adjudications, the Court loudly
affirmed a robust version of the categorical approach, in which
consultation of the record of conviction through the modified categorical
approach may occur only in a limited set of circumstances.212 Through
their strong endorsement of the categorical approach, Moncrieffe and
204. Id. at 34–36 (holding that whether the definition of an aggravated felony included fraud in
which the loss was over $10,000 called for a “circumstance--specific” analysis in which
adjudicators can look beyond the record); Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 689–90 (announcing
that IJs evaluating crimes involving moral turpitude should be permitted to proceed to an extra step
during the categorical approach that would permit the consideration of extra-record evidence).
205. Das, supra note 166, at 1719–25.
206. Olivas-Motta v. Holder, 716 F.3d 1199, 1200 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting deference to
Silva-Trevino); Prudencio v. Holder, 669 F.3d 472, 476 (4th Cir. 2012)
(same); Fajardo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 659 F.3d 1303, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that “Congress
unambiguously intended adjudicators to use the categorical and modified categorical approach to
determine whether a person was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude”); Jean-Louis v.
Att’y Gen. 582 F.3d 462, 473 (3d Cir. 2009) (characterizing Silva-Trevino as “bottomed on an
impermissible reading of the statute which . . . speaks with the requisite clarity”). Contra Bobadilla
v. Holder, 679 F.3d 1052, 1057 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding Silva-Trevino’s methodology “must be
given deference by a reviewing court”); see Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737, 742 (7th Cir. 2008)
(deferring to the BIA’s decision that immigration judges “may go beyond the record of conviction
to characterize or classify an offense”).
207. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
208. 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
209. Moncrieffe, 133 S. Ct. at 1693–94.
210. See, e.g., id. at 1684–85, 1690–94 (finding no “case-specific factfinding . . . apparent in
the INA” and rejecting “post hoc investigation into the facts of predicate offenses”).
211. See id.
212. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 (“[T]he modified approach merely helps implement the
categorical approach when a defendant was convicted of violating a divisible statute.”); id. at 2293
(holding that “[t]he modified [categorical] approach does not authorize a sentencing court to
substitute such a facts-based inquiry for an elements-based one,” but may be used “only to
determine which alternative element in a divisible statute formed the basis of the defendant’s
conviction”).
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Descamps appear to have pushed back the BIA’s attempt to invite
immigration adjudicators to examine facts and find removability with
greater ease, often through creating more avenues for fact-finding.213 The
Court may also have introduced a much-needed antidote to some of the
complexity that has arisen in the categorical approach.
The categorical approach nonetheless remains complicated at various
levels. As with other dimensions of complex removability, this Article
does not mean to suggest that deep legal complexity accompanies every
single case involving a noncitizen facing immigration sanctions due to
prior convictions. On balance though, the legal terrain associated with
determining the immigration consequences of criminal activity is contested
and dynamic. It suggests that removability might often not be a foregone
conclusion for lawful residents in removal proceedings because of criminal
convictions.
C. The Constitutional Boundaries of the Government’s Removal
Powers: Suppressing Evidence of Alienage
Citizenship and the categorical approach are not the only complex areas
of removability. Removability can become complex even when an
individual does not have a claim to lawful status under the INA, and does
not expect to acquire lawful status in the near future. Suppression motions
in the immigration context, in which individuals facing removal allege that
evidence of their alienage was obtained unlawfully and request that IJs
suppress that evidence,214 present a third dimension of complex
removability.
In recent years, the expansion of immigration enforcement has
prompted noncitizens and their attorneys to pursue motions to suppress
evidence of alienage in immigration court.215 In the mid-2000s, the Bush
Administration aggressively deployed immigration “raids” to apprehend
removable individuals.216 Many were the result of ICE’s Fugitive
Operations Team, a federal initiative launched in 2003 to apprehend
individuals with prior removal orders.217 Other raids took place at
workplaces where federal officials suspected that employers were hiring
213. See, e.g., Lanferman, 25 I. & N. Dec. 721, 727–29 (B.I.A. 2012) (adopting an approach in
which the documents of an alien’s record of conviction should always be considered).
214. See Motions to Suppress in Removal Proceedings, AM . IMMIGR . COUNCIL,
http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/clearinghouse/litigation-issue-pages/enforcement-motionssuppress (last visited Nov. 28, 2013).
215. See BESS CHIU ET AL., CARDOZO IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A
REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME RAID OPERATIONS 12 (2009), available at http://cw.routledge.com/
textbooks/9780415996945/human-rights/cardozo.pdf.
216. Id. at 1.
217. Id. at 5; Nathan Treadwell, Fugitive Operations and the Fourth Amendment:
Representing Immigrants Arrested in Warrantless Home Raids, 89 N.C. L. REV. 507, 513–18
(2011) (describing Fugitive Operations Teams and home raids).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 4

1838

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

unauthorized workers.218 Advocates reported that ICE officials, often in
collaboration with local police, targeted workplaces, neighborhoods, and
homes to question individuals suspected of immigration violations.219
Raids often were unannounced, involved the use of force, separated
families, and instilled fear in immigrant communities.220 Many
immigration advocates intuitively sensed that ICE’s actions exceeded the
limits of appropriate government action. Moreover, many of the
noncitizens identified through immigration raids and other enforcement
actions had few legal options to pursue discretionary relief from
deportation. Reports also surfaced of individuals being pressured to agree
to their own removal, or being criminally prosecuted in mass hearings
involving truncated procedures.221
Motions to suppress emerged in the late 2000s as a strategic response
by immigration advocates to the government’s use of raids against
noncitizens.222 Motions to suppress generally seek to exclude from a
removal hearing evidence of the individual’s alienage.223 As with claims to
citizenship, without evidence of alienage, removal proceedings must be
terminated.224 Unlike claims to citizenship, a successful motion to suppress
does not confer any legal status on a noncitizen.225 Instead, a motion to
suppress operates purely as a defensive strategy by attacking removability,
while leaving the individual’s immigration status unchanged.226
Immigration lawyers in recent years have filed an increasing number of
motions to suppress in immigration court,227 and have prevailed in a small,
but significant, number of cases.228
218. See Worksite Enforcement Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Apr. 30,
2009),
http://web.archive.org/web/20100706021916/http://www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/
worksite.htm (archived) (showing an increase in the total number of worksite enforcement arrests
from 1,292 in 2005 to 6,287 in 2008).
219. See CHIU ET AL., supra note 215, at 3; Katherine Evans, The Ice Storm in U.S. Homes: An
Urgent Call for Policy Change, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 561, 572–73 (2009) (describing
tactics used during home-based immigration raids).
220. See CHIU ET AL., supra note 215, at 3.
221. See Peter R. Moyers, Butchering Statutes: The Postville Raid and the Misinterpretation of
Federal Criminal Law, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 651, 665–87 (2009).
222. See CHIU ET AL., supra note 215, at 12.
223. See Motions to Suppress in Removal Proceedings, supra note 214.
224. Compare EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note 11, at B1, with 8 C.F.R.
§ 1240.8(c) (2013), and 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (2012).
225. See CHIU ET AL., supra note 215, at 24–25.
226. See id.
227. See id. at 14 (“Since 2006, there has been a nine-fold increase in the filing of suppression
motions, a twenty-two-fold increase in suppression motions related to home raids, and a five-fold
increase in the grant rate of suppression motions.”); Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?
Immigration Courts and the Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J.
1563, 1627 (2010) (noting that suppression motions are “far more numerous” now than when INS v.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984), was decided).
228. See Motions to Suppress in Removal Proceedings, supra note 214 (listing immigration
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Several evolving sources of law may potentially support an effort to
suppress evidence of alienage. The Fourth Amendment serves as the most
obvious legal authority for a suppression motion, given that it has long
been invoked in the criminal context to exclude evidence obtained through
an unlawful search or seizure.229 In 1984, however, the Supreme Court
ruled in INS v. Lopez-Mendoza230 that the exclusionary rule generally does
not apply in immigration cases.231 The Court echoed the longstanding—
though heavily criticized232—rule that deportation proceedings are civil
actions to which criminal constitutional protections do not apply.233 The
Court emphasized that the vast majority of noncitizens apprehended by
immigration enforcement officials agreed to voluntary departure and
therefore did not contest the allegations behind deportation.234 The Court
also suggested that the now-renamed Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) had developed an adequate regulatory scheme to deter
constitutional violations, and that alternative remedies, such as bringing a
civil suit and seeking declaratory relief, were available to noncitizens.235
Notably, the Court pointed to “a deliberately simple deportation hearing
system, streamlined to permit the quick resolution of very large numbers of
deportation actions,”236 suggesting that introducing the exclusionary rule
would upset that simplicity.237 Thus, Lopez-Mendoza—the bedrock case
standing for the principle that the exclusionary rule does not apply in
immigration proceedings—affirmed the idea that removability is generally
a simple matter.
Although the central holding of Lopez-Mendoza remains good law, it
has shown signs of weakening in recent years.238 For starters, the
court, BIA, and federal court decisions involving suppression motions); see also Chacón, supra
note 227, at 1614 (“Interestingly, the number of circumstances that some courts are willing to
recognize as ‘egregious violations’ has increased a bit in recent years.”).
229. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (providing for the suppression of
evidence obtained through Fourth Amendment violations).
230. 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
231. Id. at 1050 (“In these circumstances we are persuaded that the Janis balance between
costs and benefits comes out against applying the exclusionary rule in civil deportation hearings
held by the INS.”).
232. E.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some Thoughts
on Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1899–1914 (2000); Markowitz,
supra note 144, at 1301.
233. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
234. Id. at 1044 (“Over 97.5% apparently agree to voluntary deportation without a formal
hearing.”).
235. Id. at 1044–45.
236. Id. at 1048.
237. Id.
238. See Irene Scharf, The Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Proceedings: Where It Was,
Where It Is, Where It May Be Going, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 53 (2010) (commenting on the
weakening of the Lopez-Mendoza rule not requiring application of the Fourth Amendment in
immigration proceedings).
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immigration enforcement landscape has radically changed in the almost
thirty years since Lopez-Mendoza was decided.239 Indeed, some
commentators have persuasively argued in favor of overturning it,240 in
large part due to strong evidence that the justifications proffered by the
Court have become outdated.241 More importantly, a plurality of the LopezMendoza Court recognized in dicta that the Fourth Amendment might
apply in the case of “egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other
liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and
undermine the probative value of the evidence obtained,” or if evidence of
widespread constitutional violations were to become apparent.242
Relying on the Court’s language regarding egregious violations of the
Fourth Amendment serving as the basis for suppression in the immigration
context, several federal courts of appeal have explicitly recognized that the
exclusionary rule might apply to immigration cases in a range of
circumstances. These cases have suggested that the Lopez-Mendoza
exception applies to widespread constitutional violations,243 deliberate
constitutional violations,244 conduct that undermines the reliability of the
evidence,245 conduct that a “reasonable officer should have known”
violates the Constitution,246 stops based on race or “grossly improper”
239. In fiscal year 2011, the number of formal removals eclipsed voluntary returns for the year,
for the first time since fiscal year 1941; the number of formal removals in fiscal year 2011 was also
almost twenty-one-times higher than in fiscal year 1984, the year Lopez-Mendoza was decided. See
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2011 YEARBOOK OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102 (2012) (showing 391,953 formal removals and 323,542 voluntary
returns in fiscal year 2011, and 18,696 formal removals and 909,833 voluntary returns in fiscal year
1984), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/
yearbook/2011/ois_yb_2011.pdf.
240. See, e.g., Chacón, supra note 227, at 1624–27; Stella Burch Elias, ‘Good Reason to
Believe’: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the
Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1115, 1155–57.
241. See Elias, supra note 240, at 1115, 1140–54.
242. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51. It is worth noting that while the language with
respect to egregious violations appeared in a plurality opinion, because four of the dissenting
Justices would have applied the Fourth Amendment across the board in removal proceedings, in
reality eight Justices shared the belief that at minimum egregious circumstances would warrant
application of the Fourth Amendment. See Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 271 (3d Cir.
2012) (describing how “eight Justices agreed that the exclusionary rule should apply in
deportation/removal proceedings involving egregious or widespread Fourth Amendment
violations”).
243. Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 279–82.
244. Orhorhaghe v. INS, 38 F.3d 488, 501–02 (9th Cir. 1994); Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22
F.3d 1441, 1449 n.5 (9th Cir. 1994) (“We emphasize that [we do not] hold that only bad faith
violations are egregious, but rather that all bad faith constitutional violations are egregious.”).
245. Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 278; Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir.
2006).
246. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2008); Gonzalez-Rivera,
22 F.3d at 1449.
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factors,247 stops that involve lengthy detentions,248 and stops that employ a
“show or use of force,”249 or lack any “articulable suspicion
whatsoever.”250 The Ninth Circuit held, for instance, that egregious
violations of the Fourth Amendment took place when immigration agents
failed to obtain either a search or arrest warrant before entering a private
home and that the agents should have known that the Fourth Amendment
prohibits warrantless, nonconsensual searches of one’s residence.251 In a
groundbreaking decision issued in 2012, the Third Circuit adopted the
Lopez-Mendoza exceptions to a pre-dawn home immigration raid, and
articulated a flexible standard for assessing when the Fourth Amendment
could apply the exclusionary rule to suppress evidence of alienage in
removal proceedings.252 The Court of Appeals emphasized “that there is no
one-size-fits-all approach to determining whether a Fourth Amendment
violation is egregious,” and listed a number of factors that could trigger
application of the exclusionary rule.253 If courts had applied and invoked
the Lopez-Mendoza exceptions more broadly, these exceptions might have
suppressed evidence in thousands of other cases, given the evidence that
warrantless searches of private homes were fairly rampant during the Bush
Administration home raids.254
The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause also serves as a source for
motions to suppress. This is not surprising; indeed, procedural due process
has frequently served as a catchall claim for constitutional rights that
otherwise do not apply in the immigration context.255 The Fifth
247. Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 779 (8th Cir. 2010); Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at
235–37; Orhorhaghe, 38 F.3d at 498.
248. Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 236.
249. Id.
250. Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d at 779; accord Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 236.
251. Lopez-Rodriguez, 536 F.3d at 1018–19.
252. Oliva-Ramos v. Att’y Gen., 694 F.3d 259, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2012).
253. Id. at 279. These factors include: the intentionality of the violation; the characteristics and
severity of the offending conduct; the use of threats, force, or other forms of coercion to execute the
search or seizure; the extent to which agents used unreasonable force; whether the seizure or arrest
was based on racial or ethnic factors (or some other grossly improper consideration); and the bad
faith of the ICE officers. Abbey Augus & Matt Craig, Practice Advisory: Understanding OlivaRamos v. Attorney General and the Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration
Proceedings, N.Y.U. IMMIGRANT RTS. CLINIC 5–6 (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/
default/files/ECM_PRO_074309.pdf.
254. See Katherine Evans, The Ice Storm in U.S. Homes: An Urgent Call for Policy Change,
33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 561, 572, 584–87 (2009) (describing a “pattern of practice,”
based on reports of home raids nationally, in which immigration agents lack judicial warrants and
fail to obtain consent to enter); see also Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2013)
(“Breaking into someone’s home at 4:00 a.m. without a warrant or any legitimate basis need not
also include physical injury or the threat thereof for such conduct to qualify as egregious.”).
255. See Anne R. Traum, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law on Its Own Path, 33 CARDOZO
L. REV. 491, 493 (2011) (arguing that courts should continue to rely on procedural due process
arguments under the Fifth Amendment to “ensure that immigration proceedings are fair, just, and

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 4

1842

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Amendment gives noncitizens the right to removal proceedings in which
evidence—including evidence of alienage—is used in a “fundamentally
fair” manner.256 Thus, statements obtained in violation of due process, such
as coerced confessions or involuntary admissions, have been excluded
under the Fifth Amendment.257
Relatedly, regulatory provisions may also provide a basis for excluding
evidence of alienage in removal proceedings. The Supreme Court has long
held that immigration authorities, and administrative agencies generally,
must adhere to federal regulations.258 In 1980, the BIA held that evidence
obtained in violation of INS regulations could be suppressed, so long as
(1) the violated regulation was promulgated to serve “a purpose of benefit
to the alien,” and (2) the violation caused prejudice to the noncitizen.259
Lopez-Mendoza, decided four years later, did not change the BIA’s
holding.260 Importantly, several federal regulations govern immigration
agents’ conduct during raids and other immigration arrests. For instance,
absent a reasonable suspicion that an individual is or is attempting to
violate an immigration provision, immigration officers must not “restrain
the freedom of an individual, not under arrest, to walk away.”261 Another
regulation requires aliens who are “arrested without a warrant and placed
in formal [removal] proceedings” to “be advised of the reasons for his or
her arrest and the right to be represented at no expense to the
Government.”262 Similar arguments are available based on violations of
other federal immigration regulations, such as those addressing the right to
counsel,263 consent to enter,264 and coerced statements.265 At the same time,
the legal basis for some of these suppression motions has been narrowed
by the BIA’s holding that, for instance, certain advisals required by
regulation need not be given before a person is formally charged with
sufficiently transparent” rather than seek to expand the application of the Sixth Amendment); see
also Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye): Stipulated Orders of Removal and the
Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475, 487–88 (2013) (discussing the role of the
Fifth Amendment in immigration adjudication).
256. Toro, 17 I. & N. Dec. 340, 343 (B.I.A. 1980).
257. See, e.g., Garcia, 17 I. & N. Dec. 319, 320–21 (B.I.A. 1980).
258. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–68 (1954). Accardi
involved an immigration regulation, and the Supreme Court subsequently applied what has been
called the Accardi doctrine to a range of administrative agencies. See generally Thomas W. Merrill,
The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 569 (2006).
259. Garcia-Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 329.
260. 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984); accord id. at 1045 (“Evidence seized through
intentionally unlawful conduct is excluded by Department of Justice policy from the proceeding for
which it was obtained.”).
261. 8 C.F.R. § 287.8(b) (2013).
262. Id. § 287.3(c).
263. See id. § 292.5(b).
264. See id. § 287.8(f)(2).
265. See id. § 287.8(c)(2)(vii).
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removability and placed in removal proceedings.266 In some immigration
courts, regulatory arguments have had more success than constitutional
ones.267
Thus, motions to suppress are factually and legally complex matters.
The substantive law governing motions to suppress in the immigration
context remains unsettled and developing. One area of particular
uncertainty involves the application of the exclusionary rule to egregious
conduct committed by local law enforcement officers.268 Factually,
suppression motions require extensive allegations and proof in order to
succeed.269 Furthermore, noncitizens—including their counsel—must take
strong precautionary measures to not concede alienage at any point prior to
termination of the proceedings, including during informal negotiations
with ICE attorneys.270 Otherwise simple acts such as requesting a copy of
one’s “A-file”271 should be done without disclosing the country of
nationality.272
266. E-R-M-F-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 580, 585 (B.I.A. 2011).
267. See Motomura, supra note 40, at 1767–69 (discussing successful suppression motions
following immigration raids of factories in Van Nuys, California based on regulatory arguments).
268. For instance, a case pending before the Eleventh Circuit involves the application of the
exclusionary rule to the conduct of Palm Beach Gardens Police Department officers. JimenezDomingo v. Holder, No. 12-14048 (11th Cir. filed Aug. 6, 2012); see also Melissa Crow &
Matthew Price, Lopez-Mendoza Reconsidered: The Changing Face of Immigration Enforcement,
AM. IMMIGR. LAW. ASS’N IMMIGR. SLIP OPINION BLOG (Dec. 8, 2012), http://www.aila.org/content/
default.aspx?bc=45346|45345 (discussing Jimenez-Domingo). On August 13, 2013, an immigration
judge in Miami, Florida granted a motion to suppress based on egregious constitutional violations
committed by local law enforcement officers. Redacted Decision of the Honorable Denise Noonan
Slavin, Immigration Court, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U. MIAMI SCH. L. (Aug. 12,
2013), available at http://www.law.miami.edu/clinics/pdf/2012/immigration-082913-WrittenDecision-Order-Bonilla-REDACTED.pdf.
269. Motions to Suppress in Removal Proceedings: A General Overview, LEGAL ACTION
CENTER
AM.
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
28
(2011),
http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/motions_to_suppress_in_removal_proc
eedings-_a_general_overview_11-12-13_fin.pdf (“To establish a prima facie case [for suppression], the
motion must . . . be specific and detailed . . . and . . . list the evidence to be suppressed.”).
270. Maria T. Baldini-Potermin et al., Motions to Suppress: Breathing New Life into the
Exclusionary Rule in Removal Proceedings, in IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW HANDBOOK
415, 423–25 (Richard J. Link ed., 2008–09 ed. 2008).
271. An A-file is the individual case file compiled by immigration authorities, which often
serves as the single source of discovery in immigration cases. See Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365,
368 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An A-file is the file maintained by various government agencies for each alien
on record.”).
272. Although the government is required to provide a copy of the “A-file” as a matter of due
process in the Ninth Circuit, id. at 374, in many instances individuals facing removal must file a
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request in order to obtain a copy of the file. See id. (noting the
government’s argument “that an individual seeking access to records about himself ‘must submit a
written request’ to the Freedom of Information Act . . . office” (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 103.21 (2013)).
The FOIA form used for immigration purposes, Form G-639, requests that the individual list his or
her country of birth. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM G-639,
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To be clear, despite the federal courts’ and administrative agencies’
relative receptiveness to entertaining motions to suppress, successfully
prevailing in one’s case through termination of the proceedings remains
fairly difficult.273 In a number of jurisdictions, courts have held that
evidence of identity cannot be suppressed,274 so that an individual whose
name is matched to a government database that provides evidence of
alienage will still be found removable.275 Furthermore, because of the
complexity of suppression motions, noncitizens often require counsel—
preferably, experienced counsel—in order to identify viable claims and
succeed.276 Nonetheless, the complex issues that motions to suppress raise
show that removability can be far more complicated than simply
demanding that individuals show the government their papers. As the
motion to suppress example and the next section on administrative
discretion show, a meaningful portion of the immigrant population may
have unauthorized presence but still prevail on removability.
D. Immigration “Relief” Without Statutory Sanction: Administrative
Discretion and Deferred Action
Administrative discretion in immigration law serves as a fourth
dimension of complex removability. The term “administrative discretion”
refers to the Executive Branch’s ability to decline to seek the removal of
certain individuals or categories of individuals. It is well-established in
immigration law that Congress has plenary power to describe the rules
governing who should be admitted and removed.277 However, as Professors
Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez have shown, the President has long
exercised immigration power as well.278 As Professors Cox and Rodriguez
FREEDOM
OF
INFORMATION/PRIVACY
ACT
REQUEST
(2012),
available
at
http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/g-639.pdf.
273. See Treadwell, supra note 217, at 567.
274. See, e.g., United States v. Scroggins, 599 F.3d 433, 450 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Farias-Gonzalez, 556 F.3d 1181, 1189 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Oscar-Torres, 507 F.3d
224, 230 (4th Cir. 2007). But see, e.g., United States v. Aragon-Robles, 45 Fed. App’x 590, 591
(9th Cir. 2002) (holding that identity-related evidence could be suppressed if seized
unconstitutionally on the basis of race).
275. See CHIU ET AL., supra note 215, at 24 (“Suppression motions are inconsequential if ICE
has an alternative source of evidence wholly independent of the constitutional violation.”).
276. See id. at 24 (noting the difficulty of winning a suppression motion); cf. id. at 25
(“[S]uppression motions have not traditionally been a standard part of removal defense practice”).
277. The plenary power doctrine is one of the most heavily critiqued doctrines in immigration
law. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1998); Louis Henkin, The Constitution
and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 853 (1987); Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255.
278. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 459, 483–505 (2009).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/4

42

Koh: Rethinking Removability

2013]

RETHINKING REMOVABILITY

1845

explain, Congress has enacted harsh rules governing removal—rules that
make approximately 11 million individuals subject to possible deportation
in comparison to the approximately 400,000 deported last year.279 The
Executive Branch possesses a great degree of prosecutorial discretion over
whom to remove, thus amounting to what Professors Cox and Rodriguez
call a “de facto delegation” of immigration power.280 It is worth noting, of
course, that underenforcement is not unique to immigration law, given that
most other civil enforcement contexts—tax laws, securities laws, etc.—
involve a mismatch between statutory rules and prosecutorial resources.281
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion to prevent the removal of
certain individuals or groups is not new in immigration law,282 but in the
past two years, the Obama Administration has brought the issue to the
front lines of immigration law and policy.283 In June 2011, ICE Director
John Morton issued a memorandum to the agency’s attorneys, officers, and
agents prioritizing certain types of cases for removal (ranging from
national security risks to “those who have engaged in immigration fraud”)
while indicating that other cases (such as those involving U.S. military
veterans and long-time lawful permanent residents) should “warrant
279. Id. at 512–13 (characterizing immigration as a field in which, similar to criminal law,
“extremely broad . . . liability, coupled with the existence of prosecutorial discretion and inevitable
underenforcement of the law, results in the delegation of great authority to the officials who decide
whether to initiate” either a criminal prosecution or an immigration enforcement action); ANDORRA
BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42958, UNAUTHORIZED ALIENS: POLICY OPTIONS FOR PROVIDING
TARGETED
IMMIGRATION
RELIEF
1
(2013),
available
at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42958.pdf (noting that the “unauthorized alien population” is
“estimated to number more than 11 million today”); Elise Foley, Obama Deportation Toll Could
Pass 2 Million at Current Rates, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 2013, 7:01 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/31/obama-deportation_n_2594012.html (noting that more
than 400,000 individuals were removed in the 2012 fiscal year).
280. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 278, at 517–18. To be clear, the Executive Branch has very
little discretion through its immigration judges, who are limited by statutory rules restricting
eligibility for discretionary relief from removal.
281. See, e.g., Ezra Ross & Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of
Corporate and White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 453, 456–57 (2011).
282. See KATE M. MANUEL & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42924,
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: LEGAL ISSUES 7–8 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42924.pdf (describing the history of prosecutorial discretion
generally); Letter from Hiroshi Motomura, Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law, U.C.L.A.
Sch. of Law, et al., to the President of the United States (May 28, 2012), available at
http://www.nilc.org/document.html?id=754 (explaining, on behalf of ninety-six immigration law
professors, that the Executive Branch has historically exercised prosecutorial discretion in
immigration matters through various mechanisms, namely deferred action, parole-in-place, and
deferred enforced departure). See generally MANUEL & GARVEY, supra, at 10–13 (describing the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the immigration context).
283. For a history on the use of prosecutorial discretion in immigration law prior to the Obama
Administration’s actions, see generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 246–65 (2010).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

43

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 4

1846

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

particular care.”284 The 2011 Morton Memo, which built upon a series of
similar memos, attracted attention because it was issued by an
Administration that reached record numbers of deportations despite citing
its political support for comprehensive immigration reform as a
justification for its enforcement policies.285 Although advocates criticized
the agencies for inconsistent implementation, ICE and the Executive Office
for Immigration Review (EOIR) engaged in noticeable steps to implement
the memos.286 For instance, immigration courts suspended their dockets for
short intervals while the ICE Chief Counsel’s office engaged in case-bycase review to determine which individuals might receive prosecutorial
discretion.287
A year after the Morton Memo, on June 15, 2012, the Obama
Administration announced far more groundbreaking news when it
indicated that it would categorically extend a form of administrative
discretion known as “deferred action” to certain young people who became
undocumented when they were children and met other age, education, and
residency requirements.288 Under the name “Deferred Action for
284. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All Field
Office Dirs., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens 5
(June 17, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Morton Memo], available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/securecommunities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf.
A second memorandum issued that same day advised the agency’s personnel to refrain from
seeking removal against “the victims and witnesses of crime, including domestic violence, and
individuals involved in non-frivolous efforts related to the protection of their civil rights and
liberties.” Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., Immigration & Customs Enforcement, to All
Field Office Dirs., et al., Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs 1
(June 17, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/certainvictims-witnesses-plaintiffs.pdf. One year earlier, Director Morton had indicated that ICE had the
resources to remove approximately 400,000 noncitizens and set forth priority categories for
enforcement. See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Sec’y, Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All ICE Employees, Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Aliens (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/news/releases/2010/civil-enforcement-priorities.pdf.
285. See Foley, supra note 279.
286. See Julia Preston, Deportations Under New U.S. Policy Are Inconsistent, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/13/us/politics/president-obamas-policy-ondeportation-is-unevenly-applied.html.
287. Memorandum from Peter S. Vincent, Principal Legal Advisor, Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, to All Chief Counsel and Office of the Principal Legal Advisor (Nov. 17, 2011),
available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorial-discretion/case-by-case-review-incomingcertain-pending-cases-memorandum.pdf.
288. The specific eligibility criteria are: (1) being under the age of thirty-one as of June 15,
2012; (2) arrival in the United States before the age of sixteen; (3) continuous residence in the
United States from June 15, 2007 to the present; (4) physical presence in the United States on June
15, 2012, and at the time of application; (5) either entry without inspection before June 15, 2012, or
expiration of valid immigration status on or before June 15, 2012; (6) as of the date of the
application, being in school, having graduated or obtained a certificate of completion from high
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Childhood Arrivals” (DACA), the program offers benefits that are tangible
but limited. Its main features are a two-year reprieve from removal and a
two-year work authorization card.289 With work authorization comes the
ability to apply for a Social Security number and, in most states, a driver’s
license.290 Individuals who face pending removal proceedings, or have
previously been ordered removed but never left the country, have the most
to gain from DACA because it provides a defense to removal (or execution
of a previously issued removal order).291 The availability of protection for
such individuals is meaningful, given that a prior removal order could
ordinarily make an individual a “fugitive alien.”292 But the Administration
was very clear about DACA’s limitations. DACA does not lead to a
permanent, or even statutorily sanctioned, status in the United States.293
Thus, under the immigration statute, DACA recipients continue to be
removable—and are generally not eligible for statutory relief from
removal—but should not be physically removed.
Despite its limitations, DACA represented a political and moral victory
to its recipients and supporters. DACA’s creation followed Congress’s
refusal to pass the DREAM Act, legislation that would have provided a
formal pathway to lawful residence for young people who came to the
United States as children and had completed either higher education or
school, having obtained a GED, or having been honorably discharged from the military; and (7) not
having been convicted of a felony, “significant misdemeanor,” or three nonsignificant
misdemeanors, and not otherwise threatening national or public safety. U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-821D, INSTRUCTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/
files/form/i-821dinstr.pdf; see also Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec.,
to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., et al. (June 15, 2012),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individualswho-came-to-us-as-children.pdf; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., FORM I-821D, CONSIDERATION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (2013),
available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-821d.pdf.
289. Frequently Asked Questions: The Obama Administration’s Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (Mar. 5, 2013) [hereinafter DACA FAQ],
http://nilc.org/FAQdeferredactionyouth.html.
290. A majority of the states have indicated that they will issue driver’s licenses to DACA
recipients. See Are Individuals Granted Deferred Action Under the Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA) Policy Eligible for State Driver’s Licenses?, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CENTER (June 19,
2013), http://www.nilc.org/dacadriverslicenses.html (listing state policies). But see infra text
accompanying notes 304–06 (discussing Arizona and North Carolina).
291. DACA FAQ, supra note 289.
292. See Fugitive Operations, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
fugitive-operations (last visited Sept. 5, 2013) (“A fugitive alien is a person who has failed to leave
the United States after he or she receives a final order of removal, deportation or exclusion, or who
has failed to report to ICE after receiving notice to do so.”).
293. Similarly, DACA provided no immediate benefit to the family members of its recipients.
See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 288, at 3 (“This memorandum confers no
substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship.”).
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military service.294 When the proposed legislation failed to receive the
requisite number of votes in Congress,295 its advocates shifted their efforts
to administrative solutions since the coming election year would prevent
the DREAM Act from being reintroduced in Congress.296
For the most part, the basic eligibility requirements for DACA are fairly
simple to meet in individual cases. The adjudication times for DACA are
fast by immigration standards,297 and a number of applicants have made
use of free legal clinics to prepare their applications without hiring
lawyers.298 But DACA (and other exercises of administrative discretion in
immigration law) directly raises at least two areas of complexity in the
removability inquiry.
First, DACA creates a seemingly simple administrative program that
must still account for an otherwise intricate statutory and regulatory
immigration (and criminal) law framework. Like a raft floating atop an
ocean, DACA offers temporary safety to those who would otherwise
drown in the statute’s harsh rules on removability. But the process of
sorting out the raft from the ocean has raised a number of questions along
the way. Soon after DHS released the details of the administrative process,
in August 2012, attorneys and advocates identified harder questions that
went beyond DACA’s seemingly easy eligibility requirements, and that
reflected the layering of DACA’s administrative nature atop the broader
legal framework.299 Questions ranged from whether DACA applicants
should disclose the use of false Social Security numbers—despite the
294. Also known as the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act, the
DREAM Act was initially introduced in the Senate in 2001, S. 1291, 107th Cong. (2001), and also
had parallel versions in the House.
295. See Elise Foley, DREAM Act Vote Fails in Senate, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 18, 2010),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/18/dream-act-vote-senate_n_798631.html; see also Elisha
Barron, Recent Development, The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM)
Act, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 623, 631–38 (2011) (describing history of the DREAM Act and the
2010 legislative session).
296. See Press Release, America’s Voice, Will There Be Any Relief for Dreamers This
Election Year? Only the President Can Make It Happen (May 31, 2012),
http://americasvoiceonline.org/press_releases/will-there-be-any-relief-for-dreamers-this-electionyear-only-the-president-can-make-it-happen.
297. See DACA FAQ, supra note 289 (noting that “USCIS has said it is taking them, on
average, 4 to 6 months to make a decision on an application”); Deferred Action Approval Averages,
LEXSPOT, https://lexspot.com/daca_approvals (last visited Nov. 28, 2013) (noting that DACA
approval times had lengthened considerably and were up to five months).
298. See, e.g., Elizabeth Slagle Todaro & Karla McKanders, Leveling the Playing Field: Pro
Bono’s Impact on Immigration, TENN. B.J., Jan. 2013, at 14 (noting legal clinics being set up for
DACA applicants); Dreamers, TEX. C.R. PROJECT, http://www.texascivilrightsproject.org/dreamers/
(last visited Nov. 28, 2013) (listing DACA clinics across Texas).
299. Dan Berger & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Should
Undocumented Young People Apply?, LEXISNEXIS EMERGING ISSUES ANALYSIS, Sept. 2012,
available at LEXIS, 2012 EMERGING ISSUES 6632 (noting several “unresolved or thorny issues,” but
that “[s]everal nonprofits have developed excellent guides that address” them).
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point-blank question in one of the required forms to list “all numbers ever
used”300—to how to describe one’s manner of entry so as not to undermine
potential future claims to permanent immigration status.301 DACA’s
treatment of prior criminal convictions, too, announced a completely new
series of rules for assessing the immigration consequences of crime that
runs counter to the “usual” rules of immigration law.302 To be sure, the
Administration sought to provide as much assurance as it could to DACA
stakeholders; for instance, the Administration clarified that most users of
false social security numbers need not disclose that fact in their DACA
applications and stated its intent to not refer low-priority cases to ICE
following a denial of DACA.303 Nonetheless, DACA calls for the
permanent disclosure of personal, and potentially incriminating,
information to the very agency—DHS—that has the authority to detain and
deport. Much of the promise of DACA lies in the political goodwill of the
current Administration and in the hope for a broader legislative solution.
Second, DACA presents a dimension of complex removability because
of its inherently tenuous nature and its contribution to our understanding of
the relationships among removability, unauthorized presence, and
illegality. The Administration has been clear from the onset that DACA
300. Outside the DACA context, use of a false Social Security number can have adverse
immigration consequences and lead to criminal liability. See Guardado-Garcia v. Holder, 615 F.3d
900, 902 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding noncitizen’s prior conviction for misuse of Social Security
number under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (2012) constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, thus
making him removable).
301. Cf. Quilantan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 285, 293 (B.I.A. 2010) (holding that an alien who falsely
claims U.S. citizenship is not properly admitted, but that “an alien who physically presents herself
for questioning and makes no knowing false claim to citizenship is ‘inspected,’ even though she
volunteers no information and is asked no questions by the immigration authorities”).
302. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVICES (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov (follow “Consideration of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals Process” hyperlink under “Humanitarian”) (indicating that any
conviction for driving under the influence will constitute a “significant misdemeanor” that will
render an individual ineligible for DACA). In contrast, under the federal immigration statute, a
conviction for simple DUI does not constitute a ground of either inadmissibility or removability.
See Lopez-Meza, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1188, 1194 (B.I.A. 1999). In certain respects, the criminal
guidelines surrounding DACA are more forgiving than the INA, as interpreted by the agency and
the courts, for instance with respect to simple drug possession offenses and expunged offenses. See
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2012) (inadmissibility for controlled substance offenses); id.
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) (deportability for controlled substance offenses); Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646
F.3d 684, 689–90 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (holding, consistent with the majority rule in the BIA
and other circuit courts, that offenses expunged under state law can serve as a basis for
removability, but declining to apply the rule retroactively in the Ninth Circuit).
303. Several months after the announcement of the DACA process, CIS clarified that the
Employment Authorization Document only required applicants to list Social Security numbers
officially issued by the Social Security Administration. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.uscis.gov (follow “Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Process” hyperlink under “Humanitarian”; then follow
“Frequently Asked Questions” hyperlink in the second paragraph).
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and other forms of administrative relief are temporary and contingent upon
the Executive Branch’s willingness to interpret the immigration laws
consistent with DACA. Other governmental authorities—such as state
governments and vocal minorities in the immigration enforcement agency
and the Judiciary—have refused to accept the legitimacy of DACA.
Various actors have sought to emphasize DACA-eligible individuals’
continuing unauthorized status notwithstanding their non-removability in
the eyes of the President. Arizona Governor Jan Brewer ordered that the
state not issue driver’s licenses to DACA recipients.304 The state of North
Carolina reluctantly decided to issue driver’s licenses,305 but those licenses
read “NO LAWFUL STATUS” across the front.306 Ten ICE officers filed a
lawsuit in federal district court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to
invalidate DACA and announcing their belief that DACA constitutes an
invalid exercise of executive authority because the immigration statute
mandates the removal of DACA-eligible individuals.307 And Justice Scalia,
in his dissenting opinion in Arizona v. United States, included a scathing
critique of DACA—even though the program was announced just two
weeks prior to the issuance of the opinion and was therefore not part of the
Court’s record.308 It should come as no surprise, then, that media
descriptions of DACA recipients have varied, ranging from “young
immigrants” to “illegal.”309
304. Ariz. Exec. Order No. 2012-06, 18 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 2237, 2237 (Sept. 7, 2012),
available at http://www.azsos.gov/aar/2012/36/governor.pdf.
305. Letter from Grayson G. Kelley, Chief Deputy Att’y Gen., N.C. Dep’t of Justice, to J. Eric
Boyette, Acting Comm’r, N.C. Div. of Motor Vehicles 2–3 (Jan. 17, 2013), available at
http://www.wral.com/asset/news/local/2013/01/17/11992902/AG_letter_to_DMV_on_DACA_
licenses.pdf (arguing that the North Carolina Department of Transportation is required by law to
issue driver’s licenses); Press Release, N.C. Dep’t of Transp., Div. of Motor Vehicles, NCDOT to
Issue Driver Licenses for Those Who Quality Under DACA (Feb. 14, 2013), available at
http://www.ncdot.gov/download/dmv/DACA/PressReleaseDACA.pdf.
306. See Larry Copeland, N.C.’s Immigrant Driver’s License Plan Sparks Protests, USA
TODAY (Mar. 8, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/03/07/ncs-immigrantdrivers-license-plan-sparks-protests/1972119.
307. Complaint at 13–14, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23,
2012), 2012 WL 3629252. On July 31, 2013, the district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under the Civil Service Reform Act. Order at 6-7, Crane v. Napolitano,
No. 3:12-CV-03247-O (N.D. Tex. July 31, 2013). Prior to dismissing the lawsuit, the Court had
indicated that it believed the ICE agent plaintiffs were likely to succeed in their claim that DACA
violated 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2012), but declined to issue a preliminary injunction in light of
its jurisdictional concerns. Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2013),
2013 WL 1744422, at *13, *19–20.
308. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that “[t]he husbanding of scarce enforcement resources can hardly be the justification for”
the DACA program given the administrative cost of processing applications for DACA);
Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, supra note 288.
309. See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 306 (discussing driver’s licenses issued by the state of
North Carolina to DACA recipients); Young Illegal Immigrants Seek Work Permits (NPR radio
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DACA and other forms of administrative discretion occupy a slightly
different place in comparison to the other areas of immigration law
discussed in this Part. The preceding discussion of complex removability—
involving claims to citizenship, the categorical approach to assessing the
immigration consequences of crime, and motions to suppress evidence of
alienage—present examples in which removability is primarily a legal
question, and affects persons in removal proceedings.310 The legal
outcomes in those examples are heavily dependent on facts and,
importantly, on agency behavior, but the key question is whether the
individual is removable. But administrative discretion in immigration law
presents a lens through which to examine removability’s contested nature,
even in cases where individuals might technically be removable or have
not yet had their removability adjudicated. Indeed, as each of the
Administration’s memoranda regarding the exercise of administrative
discretion clarifies, the availability of administrative discretion does not
carry with it an enforceable right.311 But DACA nonetheless challenges the
conventional wisdom that unlawful status (or any immigration status) is
simple. It also highlights how removability and unlawful status are distinct
but closely related—and inherently complex—concepts. In combination
with the other three areas of law, a (slightly messy) story of complex
removability emerges. The next Part draws out several common themes
that tie these four dimensions of complex removability together.
III. RECURRING THEMES IN COMPLEX REMOVABILITY
One of the basic goals of this Article is to challenge the conventional
wisdom that removability is inevitably streamlined and simple. Both
legally and factually, the dimensions of complex removability discussed in
Part II—claims to citizenship, the categorical approach, motions to
suppress, and administrative discretion—reveal that removability is not
necessarily a settled matter.
Having established that removability is complex as a matter of law,
fact, and principle, this Part seeks to articulate how (and to some degree
why) removability has become complicated. It does so by articulating
several recurring themes in complex removability. The first is a simple
observation: removability has grown more complex in large part because
of the relative absence of substantive, discretionary relief from removal
under the current statute. The second theme focuses on the effect of
immigration detention—specifically the absence of counsel and the
pressures of time—on challenges to removability. The third theme involves
broadcast Sept. 26, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/09/26/161820071/young-illegalimmigrants-seek-work-permits.
310. See supra Sections II.A–C.
311. See, e.g., 2011 Morton Memo, supra note 284, at 6; Memorandum from Janet Napolitano,
supra note 288, at 3.
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the relationship between complex removability and immigration status, and
underscores the fluidity and uncertainty that attaches to immigration status.
The fourth theme explores the social and legal production of removability,
and emphasizes that removability is often created through dynamic
interactions between the government and the individual. Finally, this Part
observes that different authorities may have conflicting visions of
removability, and that (despite the narrative of plenary power in the
immigration realm) no single governmental entity speaks with definitive
power when it comes to questions of removability.
A. (Un)availability of Substantive Immigration Relief
Like a steam valve moving pressure from one end of the system to
another,312 the absence of formal substantive relief from removal appears
to have driven the growing complexity of removability. Under current law,
particularly since 1996, many individuals facing removal—even those with
strong family, community, or time-based ties to the United States—simply
do not have a way to directly seek a reprieve from removal. Indeed, various
scholars have explored the human and legal costs associated with
IIRIRA.313
For individuals with prior criminal convictions, IIRIRA drastically
contracted the availability of discretionary relief from removal.314
Categorical approach claims have grown because over the past several
decades, and since 1996 in particular, Congress has progressively increased
the immigration penalties associated with criminal convictions and
broadened the categories of crimes that lead to those penalties.315 A
growing number of convictions lead to deportation and also preclude
discretionary relief.316 Categorical approach arguments have thus become
crucial to either contesting removability altogether or challenging the kind
of removability alleged (e.g., removability for an aggravated felony
312. Similar analogies to pressures systems have been made with respect to immigration
federalism. Peter Spiro has suggested that “steam-valve virtues of federalism” exist by allowing
states to regulate immigration, because doing so “diminishes the pressure on the structure as a
whole.” See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627,
1636 (1997).
313. See, e.g., KANSTROOM, supra note 46, at 10 (“The 1996 laws have been severely criticized
for the devastation they have wrought on families, for their rigidity, and for their retroactivity.”).
314. Prior to 1996, most individuals facing deportation due to prior convictions could seek
discretionary relief under § 212(c) of the INA. The 1996 laws abolished § 212(c) relief and replaced
it with a form of relief known as “cancellation of removal,” which became unavailable to anyone
with an aggravated felony conviction. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994) (repealed 1996); INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 294–97 (2001) (explaining the availability of § 212(c) relief and the repeal of
eligibility for such relief through IIRIRA and AEDPA). See generally Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581,
584–85 (B.I.A. 1978) (developing factors for the exercise of discretion in § 212(c) applications).
315. See supra notes 190–92 and accompanying text.
316. See Koh, supra note 10, at 269–73.
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conviction).317 Similarly, claims to U.S. citizenship made during removal
proceedings and illegal reentry prosecutions are often most contested
where the individuals face allegations and charges that could lead to harsh
civil and criminal sanctions with little middle ground.318
Other aspects of complex removability appear to have arisen because of
a mismatch between the equitable claims of those facing removal and the
options available under the law. The 1996 statutes (and subsequent
developments) made it more difficult for individuals without immigration
status, even those with clean criminal records, to develop substantive
defenses to removal, such as through asylum or family-based mechanisms.
The rule that requires an individual to file asylum claims within one year of
arriving in the United States, among other rules, has prevented countless
individuals from obtaining asylum.319 In the family-based context, the
three- and ten-year unlawful presence bars to admission—triggered
through the accrual of unlawful status plus a physical departure from the
United States—made it far more arduous for the relatives of citizens and
lawful permanent residents to acquire lawful status than it had been prior to
1996.320 With few options available under the law, workplace immigration
raids ended with the removal of workers, often whose only transgression
was working and living in the United States without papers.321 Although
ICE claimed that most home raids were intended to identify “fugitive
aliens” (i.e., individuals previously ordered removed), one study showed
that ICE regularly engaged in “collateral arrests” that led to the removal of
any resident identified through the raid, many of whom had no prior
immigration or criminal violations.322 Motions to suppress evidence of
alienage arose in a context where the immigration laws foreclosed
opportunities for most unauthorized immigrants to obtain lawful status, but
where ICE nevertheless pursued enforcement against those with arguably

317. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
318. See supra Section I.B.
319. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012). See generally Michele R. Pistone & Philip G.
Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved but Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2001)
(describing and critiquing the one-year deadline and expedited removal procedures for entrants at
the border as two major restrictions on asylum created by the 1996 laws).
320. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9). The creation of a provisional waiver for immediate relatives of
U.S. citizens in 2013 will likely ameliorate some of the effects of the unlawful presence bars. See
Provisional Unlawful Presence Waivers of Inadmissibility for Certain Immediate Relatives, 78 Fed.
Reg. 536, 536 (Jan. 3, 2013) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212) (describing the need for
provisional waivers).
321. For background on an immigration raid that took place in Postville, Iowa with particularly
harsh consequences on meatpacking plant workers, see Moyers, supra note 221.
322. MARGOT MENDELSON, SHAYNA STROM & MICHAEL WISHNIE, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: AN
EXAMINATION OF ICE’S FUGITIVE OPERATIONS PROGRAM (2009) (reporting that forty percent of
fugitive operations teams’ arrests in 2007 were “collateral arrests”), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/NFOP_Feb09.pdf.
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strong ties to the country.323 A similar dynamic exists in the case of the
“DREAMers” who advocated for DACA. With DACA, the
implementation of broad-scale administrative relief arose because
Congress declined to pass the DREAM Act, a measure that would have led
to permanent immigration relief for DREAMers.324 DACA recipients
generally have no other option under the law; indeed, DACA is far inferior
to permanent forms of immigration relief or status. DACA recipients
typically have compelling moral claims to the United States, however,
having come to the United States as children and pursued an education.
Assessing removability on a very broad scale reveals that removability
is complex because substantive immigration relief is woefully unavailable.
The notion that the absence of substantive claims would lead to procedural
ones is a recurring theme in immigration law. Professor Hiroshi Motomura
observed over twenty years ago that the unavailability of substantive,
constitutional rights foreclosed by the plenary doctrine has led to the
greater use of statutory interpretation and procedural claims that he
characterized as “phantom constitutional norms” and “procedural
surrogates” for constitutional decision making.325 Today, the same pattern
of movement is taking place: Inadequate substantive claims lead to either
technical, quasi-procedural claims (the categorical approach and motions to
suppress in particular, and citizenship claims to a limited degree) or
attenuated relief (such as DACA).
Furthermore, Professor Motomura’s critique of the use of phantom
norms and procedural surrogates extends to complex removability as well.
Professor Motomura noted that statutory decision making informed by
constitutional norms, for instance, suffers from the “[p]roblem of
[a]wkward or [u]npredictable [s]ubconstitutional [s]olutions,” in which
individual cases may result in justice for the immigrant, but broader, more
coherent answers to constitutional problems do not receive full
treatment.326 Similarly, the use of procedure-based arguments, though
“ameliorat[ing] the harshness of the plenary power doctrine,” fails to
produce broader consistency in the law.327 In the same vein, understanding
complex removability requires an acknowledgment that some of its
dimensions may lead to unsatisfactory results. Motions to suppress, for
instance, ultimately do not confer lasting status on an individual328 and
323. See supra Section II.C.
324. See supra Section II.D.
325. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom
Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990) [hereinafter
Motomura, Phantom Norms]; Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992)
[hereinafter Motomura, Procedural Surrogates].
326. Motomura, Phantom Norms, supra note 325, at 600–02.
327. Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 325, at 1679.
328. See supra notes 225–27 and accompanying text.
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often depend heavily on the quality of the individual’s lawyers.329 DACA
results in little more than a work permit and an assurance of
nonremoval.330 Categorical approach claims, too, often depend on meritneutral factors such as the wording of the criminal statutes.
B. Detention, Counsel, and Time
Taking a step away from the broader forces leading to complex
removability, when it comes to individual cases, contesting removability is
often a crapshoot. Success often rests upon two preconditions: (1) having a
lawyer and (2) having the time to pursue the removability argument.
Without a lawyer or time, the legal claims made available by complex
removability may realistically be meaningless to many. Claims to
citizenship, arguments under the categorical approach, and motions to
suppress can be particularly labor-intensive efforts that call for extensive
factual investigation and legal analysis.331
Individuals in immigration detention, in particular, have neither counsel
nor time. One does not have a right to government-appointed counsel in
removal proceedings.332 Some challenges to removability are so factually
and legally complex that not just any lawyer will do. Rather, sophisticated
and experienced counsel may be the deciding factor that leads to a
successful claim. But immigration detainees frequently lack the time to
obtain counsel who can assess whether the detainee might have a basis for
contesting removability. In many cases, under the threat of prolonged
detention and unable to pay for an attorney, detainees concede removability
and accept removal.333 In other cases, individuals facing contestable
charges of removability—particularly under the categorical approach or
claims to citizenship—may only receive the benefit of counsel much later
in the enforcement process, such as pending review before the federal
courts of appeal (through pro bono lawyers)334 or when facing criminal
prosecution on illegal reentry charges (through court-appointed criminal
defense counsel).
The challenges posed by detention, counsel, and time are endemic to all
kinds of claims in the immigration context, including removal and
329. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
330. See supra Section II.D.
331. See supra note 269.
332. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4) (2012) (providing the right to counsel “at no expense to the
Government” in removal proceedings).
333. See infra notes 398–400.
334. Some federal courts have meaningful pro bono representation programs in which law
firms agree to represent appellants and are guaranteed an oral argument before the court of appeals.
See Leonard J. Feldman, The Ninth Circuit’s Pro Bono Program: Making a Difference One
Appellant at a Time, FED. LAWYER, May 2008, at 44, 44 (describing accommodations made by the
Ninth Circuit to facilitate pro bono representation).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 4

1856

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

discretionary relief.335 Individuals in immigration detention are far less
likely to have lawyers,336 and far less likely to prevail in a claim,337 than
individuals who are in removal proceedings but not detained. The degree to
which the reality of immigration detention affects the development of
immigration jurisprudence merits special emphasis (even if it is not unique
to removability per se) because it underscores how material reality and the
development of immigration law are deeply connected but poorly matched.
C. Immigration Status and Removability
This section examines the relationship between removability (i.e., the
government’s ability to pursue removal against an individual) and the
concept of immigration status (i.e., the legal category that confers formal
rights and benefits on an individual to reside in the country). For starters,
complex removability underscores the uncertainty that can accompany
immigration status. Scholars have recognized that the very notion of
unauthorized presence in the United States is complicated, both because it
is not always clear whether a person’s presence is actually unauthorized
and because that status could change with political and administrative
developments.338 As Justice Brennan’s majority opinion recognized in
Plyler v. Doe,339 a 1982 Supreme Court case that many scholars regard as
the “high water mark” of immigrants’ rights,340 that “there is no assurance
that a child subject to deportation will ever be deported.”341
The four dimensions of removability discussed in this Article illustrate
how immigration status can be fluid. Others have noted that immigration
status follows a rough hierarchy of rights.342 A basic way of
conceptualizing the hierarchy would be to imagine a ladder on which U.S.
citizens occupy the top rung with the greatest status, followed by lawful
permanent residents, temporary visa holders, and undocumented
335. See Kalhan, supra note 78, at 46–49.
336. One study found that, in New York City, “[s]ixty percent of detained immigrants do not
have counsel by the time their cases are completed” while only “[t]wenty-seven percent of
nondetained immigrants do not have counsel by the time their cases are completed.” See Steering
Comm. of the N.Y. Immigrant Representation Study Report, Accessing Justice: The Availability
and Adequacy of Counsel in Removal Proceedings (pt. 1), 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 357, 363 (2011).
337. The same study discussed supra found that for nondetained immigrants, 74% who are
represented have a successful outcome, in comparison to 13% who are not represented. Of detained
immigrants, 18% who are represented have a successful outcome, in comparison to 3% who are not
represented. See id. at 363–64 (“The two most important variables affecting the ability to secure a
successful outcome in a case (defined as relief or termination) are having representation and being
free from detention.” (footnote omitted)).
338. See supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text.
339. 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
340. E.g., Motomura, Procedural Surrogates, supra note 325, at 1690.
341. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226.
342. See Legomsky, supra note 41, at 106–07; Pham, supra note 41, at 1151.
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migrants.343 Arguably, the “criminal alien” classification occupies the
bottom rung of the immigration status ladder. The concept that an
individual can ascend or descend this ladder (like the children’s game
Chutes and Ladders) is nothing new. Indeed, the immigration statute has
long recognized that individuals can adjust and lose their status.344
The removability framework reinforces the intricacy and fluidity of this
ladder. For instance, complex removability suggests that the ladder may
require more rungs than articulated above. Administrative discretion
through programs like DACA suggests an amorphous middle ground
between authorized and unauthorized status but with the right to engage in
work. The potential for movement within the hierarchy is noteworthy as
well. The citizenship dimension of complex removability, particularly
claims to citizenship brought by individuals in immigration detention,
suggests that one can move quite radically from one end of the ladder (the
“criminal alien” rung) to the other (the U.S. citizen rung).
Shifting the focus from status to removability also reveals the
limitations of thinking about immigration purely in terms of formal status.
Status and removability exist in similar but not identical spheres. With
citizenship, one is trying to confer status (or rather, show that it has already
been conferred by operation of law) and trying to prove it so as to prevent
removal. With the categorical approach, one is trying to prevent the loss of
status resulting from prior convictions or other post-entry conduct. With
motions to suppress, one is trying to argue that removal is not justified,
notwithstanding the absence (and anticipated absence) of status. With
administrative discretion, one is similarly trying to argue that removal is
not justified, notwithstanding the absence of status, and in anticipation that
Congress might confer status in the future. Put differently, immigration
status is not necessarily dispositive of removability, and vice versa, but
both are fundamental to understanding the power to remove individuals
from the country for alleged immigration law violations.
D. Dynamic Interactions Between the
Government and the Individual
Focusing on immigration status without thinking about removability
can lead to the mistaken assumption that immigration law violations are
created exclusively by the individual noncitizen without government
343. See Legomsky, supra note 41, at 106–07 (discussing hierarchy of rights “starting with
personhood and progressing to physical presence, residence, lawful residence, and citizenship”);
David A. Martin, Graduated Application of Constitutional Protections for Aliens: The Real
Meaning of Zadvydas v. Davis, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 92–101 (describing six categories of
membership levels reflecting a rough hierarchy of rights, from “applicant at the border,” “parolee,”
“entrant without inspection,” “admitted nonimmigrant,” “lawful permanent resident (or
immigrant),” to “[U.S.] citizen”).
344. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2012).
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participation. Removability is complex, not only because the law is
unsettled in many areas, but also because removability is the product of a
dynamic relationship between the state and the individual. In other words,
how government institutions at all levels interact with the noncitizen may
determine removability just as much as the formal doctrine. Each of the
four dimensions of complex removability reflects, to varying degrees, how
removability is produced.
Thus, while the vast categorical approach case law guides adjudicators
and lawyers on the kinds of crimes that fall within the ambit of the federal
immigration statutes, individual outcomes frequently depend on the nature
of both the noncitizen’s and the government’s actions. For instance, to
benefit from arguments available under the categorical approach, the
noncitizen formally contests removability. Conceding removability may
prevent the individual from making a categorical approach argument,345
and in reality, various forms of pressure to concede removability exist.346
In some cases, analysis of the statutory language under the categorical
approach alone is inconclusive. In those cases, to establish removability,
the government must obtain and submit evidence of removability from the
record of conviction.347 The government’s failure to request records from
the criminal case can preclude it from establishing removability and can
therefore lead to termination of the removal proceedings.348 In other words,
removability determinations may ultimately rest both on what the
noncitizen did (e.g., receiving a criminal conviction) and on what the
government does or fails to do (e.g., obtaining criminal records).
The nature of suppression claims in immigration also shows how
removability can depend on the dynamic interactions between the
government and the noncitizen, rather than on the actions of the noncitizen
alone. Motions to suppress require, at bottom, an allegation that the
government acted wrongfully, such as by knowingly violating the Fourth
Amendment, undermining the fundamental fairness of the proceedings, or
disregarding its own rules.349 Suppression motions thus scrutinize the
government’s actions more so than the noncitizen’s actions. Motions to
suppress depend on whether ICE agents obtain consent to enter a home,
and then on whether the noncitizen refuses to admit her country of origin in
subsequent communications with the government.350 And suppressing
alienage may only be possible if the government’s interactions with the
noncitizen continue to operate according to a certain series of rules, in
345. See infra note 404.
346. See infra text accompanying notes 398–405.
347. See supra note 168.
348. See supra note 224.
349. Cf. Motomura, supra note 40, at 1771 (analyzing suppression motions as invoking
arguments that question the competence of the governmental authority in a particular manner).
350. See Baldini-Potermin et al., supra note 270, at 416, 424–25.
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which the noncitizen refuses to concede alienage throughout the
proceedings.351 Removability outcomes thus depend on the shifting
relationship between the government and the noncitizen.
Similarly, citizenship claims may depend on whether detention officials
take such claims seriously.352 Resistance from the government may come
in the form of policy choices. For instance, the State Department’s periodic
refusal to issue U.S. passports to individuals born in circumstances under
which the agency suspected fraud by the individual’s doctor or midwife
has a significant effect on many citizenship claims.353 Citizens may also
confront barriers to their citizenship claims on an individual level when
government enforcement agents refuse to explore the legitimacy of an
individual’s potential citizenship claim.354
The case of DACA and DREAMers presents a slightly different, but
related, aspect of removability’s production. The legal developments
related to DREAMers—both legislative and administrative action—were
the product of grassroots organizing campaigns and activism.355 Most were
led by DREAMers themselves, undocumented students who publicly
identified themselves as lacking immigration status and possessed deep
confidence in the normative merit of their claims to membership in the
United States.356 For DREAMers and other individuals who might qualify
for prosecutorial discretion, the immigration statutes fail to make it
possible for them to remain in the United States with a formal status.
Nevertheless, the Administration has acknowledged the value of allowing
them to avoid deportation.357 This recognition, however, would likely not
have come about without the political activism of the DREAMers
themselves.358
To be sure, the development of any area of the law inevitably involves
the contributions of the government and the governed. But thinking about
removability as a product of dynamic interactions between the government
and the individual contrasts with the narrative of unlawfulness typically
seen in public rhetoric. Typically, immigration law violations and unlawful
status are conceptualized in terms of the individual’s actions: breaking a
law, crossing a border, receiving a conviction. The default tendency in
public discourse is to associate removability with illegality and, by

351. Id. at 424.
352. See supra text accompanying notes 129–36.
353. See supra text accompanying note 137–39.
354. See supra text accompanying notes 129–36.
355. See Miriam Jordan, Anatomy of a Deferred-Action Dream, WALL ST. J., (Oct. 14, 2012,
8:46 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443982904578046951916986168.html
(subscription required) (describing the political activism of the DREAMer movement).
356. See id.
357. See id.
358. See id.
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implication, criminality.359 Simplistic narratives of removability lead to the
assumption that persons who violate the immigration laws are “illegal”
and, therefore, criminal.360 But the simple story of removability ignores the
government’s role in establishing and determining removability, as well as
the extent to which removability often hinges on legal or factual
complexity.
E. Whose Vision of Removability?
Finally, complex removability raises a common question related to who
decides removability, even at the federal level. The Arizona v. United
States361 decision was significant because it affirmed a centuries-old
doctrine known as federal exclusivity, which establishes that the federal
government—and not the states—has exclusive control over immigration
matters.362 In comparison to the voluminous recent literature addressing
immigration federalism with respect to the role of states and localities in
regulating immigration,363 there is little analysis on the allocation of power
within the federal government when it comes to immigration. The core
doctrine operating in immigration law has been the plenary power doctrine,
which posits that Congress, not the courts, has complete and unfettered
discretion over immigration and that the Executive’s power is less clearly
defined.364 But as Professor Daniel Kanstroom has noted, “[D]eportation
involves
many
different
government
actors—legislative,
executive/administrative, and judicial—whose goals may differ
substantially.”365 A closer look at removability shows, indeed, a series of
contests amongst federal actors when it comes to identifying the precise
boundaries of power over removability.
The most obvious area of tension exists between the Article III federal
courts and the immigration-related administrative agencies of the
Executive Branch. The categorical approach in particular illustrates how
removability has become subject to a tug-of-war between the Judiciary and
the Executive Branch over authority in immigration.366 The question of
359. Neuman, supra note 3, at 1441 (“‘[I]llegal alien’ is a pejorative term, which may be
interpreted as implying that the alien is a criminal.”).
360. See Daniel Kanstroom, Post-Deportation Human Rights Law: Aspiration, Oxymoron, or
Necessity?, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 195, 199–200 (2007).
361. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
362. See Rodriguez, supra note 19, at 575–76.
363. E.g., id. at 569–74, 570 n.8.
364. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 278, at 460–62.
365. See KANSTROOM, supra note 18, at 32.
366. E.g., Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 693 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008) (“Although to date
the Department generally has deferred to the relevant circuit court in deciding which approach to
use in a given case, providing a consistent, authoritative, nationwide method for interpreting and
applying ambiguous provisions of the immigration laws . . . is one of the Department’s key
duties.”).
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whether adjudicators should engage in factual determinations to assess
crimes involving moral turpitude—the key issue at stake in former
Attorney General Mukasey’s surprise intervention in Silva-Trevino—serves
as a stark example.367 Silva-Trevino represented a politicized effort to
corrode the categorical approach in contravention of judicial precedent.368
In the four years following Silva-Trevino, most of the federal courts of
appeal that considered Silva-Trevino rejected its analysis369 and refused to
extend the judicial deference ordinarily given under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.370 In categorical approach
questions other than those raised in Silva-Trevino, the question of whether,
and to what degree, the administrative agency’s views should prevail
remains an ongoing issue in litigation.
Similar tensions between the Judiciary and executive agencies exist
with claims to citizenship and motions to suppress. In the suppression
context, given the heavy emphasis on constitutional law, one scholar has
questioned the institutional competence of immigration judges to
adjudicate motions to suppress.371 Practitioners note that some immigration
judges may respond to motions to suppress with hostility.372 The federal
courts of appeal, however, appear to have led towards measured success
with suppression motions.373 A 2013 case involving a claim to citizenship
illustrates tension between executive agencies and the Judiciary.374 Esteban
Tiznado-Reyes was deported, prosecuted for illegal reentry, sentenced to
serve fifty-one months in prison, deported again, and prosecuted a second
time for illegal reentry. During his second federal criminal trial on the
illegal reentry charges, a jury found that Mr. Tiznado-Reyes was a U.S.
citizen.375 Nonetheless, despite having been found a citizen by a federal
367. See Koh, supra note 10, at 291–94 (describing criticisms of the Silva-Trevino decision).
368. See Holper, supra note 185, at 1241–42 (describing the Silva-Trevino decision as lacking
the “law-like procedures” required to earn Chevron deference); Laura S. Trice, Adjudication By
Fiat: The Need for Procedural Safeguards in Attorney General Review of Board of Immigration
Appeal Decisions, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1766, 1776–80 (2010) (describing the procedural deficiencies
accompanying Silva-Trevino).
369. See supra note 206.
370. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984) (setting forth a two-part test for courts to determine whether
to defer to agency decisions, in which (1) “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear,” then “the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,” and (2) “if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”).
371. See Chacón, supra note 227, at 1628–30.
372. See Baldini-Potermin et al., supra note 270, at 425.
373. See supra text accompanying notes 243–53.
374. See Tim Vanderpool, Deportation Dilemma: Is the Government Trying to Boot an
American Citizen?, TUCSON WEEKLY (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/
deportation-dilemma/Content?oid=3610673 (reporting on ICE’s efforts to deport an individual
whose U.S. citizenship had been definitively decided by a federal district court).
375. See Emergency Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 10–11, In re Tiznado-Reyna, No. 12-
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court, ICE attempted to remove him for a third time and placed him in
immigration detention (including in solitary confinement) during the
removal proceedings.376 A struggle between executive agencies and the
Judiciary is nothing new in the law—administrative law scholars and the
federal courts have been grappling with the contours of judicial deference
to administrative agencies ever since the rise of the administrative state.377
Nevertheless, the Judiciary plays a meaningful role in determining
removability, even though that role is limited by the contours of the
plenary power doctrine.
In discussing the tension between the Judiciary and the administrative
agencies operating in the immigration realm, it is important to remember
that administrative actors are no monolith. Multiple agencies comprise the
overall administrative state in the immigration context.378 The agencies
most relevant to removability discussions are DHS (specifically, ICE, the
enforcement agency) and DOJ (specifically, EOIR for its role in trial-level
immigration adjudication through the immigration courts and immigration
judges, as well as the BIA as the appellate administrative agency).379 Even
within these agencies, removability determinations may differ depending
upon the actor. EOIR and the BIA are adjudicative agencies whose
adjudications bear some resemblance to formal judicial adjudications
involving administrative procedures and a formal record.380 In the
immigration context, however, often the governmental actors who
determine removability are frontline enforcement agents who are bound by
few procedural requirements.381
Tension also exists between Congress and the President. In the
immigration context, courts have not clearly allocated power between the

73953 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 2012).
376. See id. at 4–7. The Emergency Petition was summarily denied shortly thereafter as not
“warrant[ing] the intervention of this court by means of the extraordinary remedy of mandamus.”
See Tiznado-Reyna, No. 12-73953, slip op. at 1 (9th Cir. Dec. 14, 2012).
377. See KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 543 (2010) (“The Supreme Court’s Chevron decision has prompted an
amazing amount of scholarly and judicial analysis, criticism, and debate.”).
378. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW
AND POLICY 2–5 (5th ed. 2009) (describing the roles of various administrative agencies in regulating
immigration).
379. See id.
380. See generally 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1–.8 (2013) (procedures governing BIA); id. §§ 1003.12–
.47 (procedures governing immigration courts).
381. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 255, at 512–15 (describing the absence of accountability for
frontline ICE officers administering stipulated orders of removal); Michele R. Pistone & John J.
Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How the Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum
Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167, 175–93 (2006) (describing the failure of agency officials to
follow mandatory procedural safeguards associated with expedited removal, even in the presence of
third-party observers).
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President and Congress.382 By creating DACA, the Obama Administration
engaged in an arguably controversial exercise of its prosecutorial discretion
under the immigration laws. But this view is not universal. According to
the lawsuit filed by ICE agents,383 DACA represents an overstepping of the
President’s powers because the federal immigration statute is otherwise
written in mandatory terms.384 In response, Professor David Martin—who
served as general counsel of the immigration agency when the statutes that
formed the basis of the agents’ lawsuit were enacted—argued that the
lawsuit is premised on incorrect readings of the statute that would lead to
unwise policy outcomes.385 Without engaging in the merits of the
constitutionality or wisdom of DACA, the point here is simply that DACA
reveals a broader dynamic in which Congress and the President have
different views of removability. The ICE lawsuit demonstrates that the
government’s power to remove may depend on who has authority to speak
on removability questions.
IV. RETHINKING REMOVABILITY
But why does—or should—complex removability matter? What might
the policy and legal implications of taking complex removability more
seriously look like? This Part sets forth three general areas in which
rethinking removability might make a difference. It does so in fairly broad
strokes, identifying several areas of immigration policy, procedure, and
discourse that might demand reconsideration in light of the growing
complexity of removability.
The first general implication of rethinking removability may be the
simplification of removability by ameliorating some of the conditions that
complicate it. If the absence of substantive relief has driven removability’s
complexity, then one response would be to increase the availability of
substantive relief through a variety of mechanisms. The most obvious form
of substantive relief, which began to gain significant traction in 2013,
382. See Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 278, at 460–61 (describing how the courts have
historically set forth two visions of the “President’s power over immigration: one grounded in
inherent executive authority under the Constitution, the other rooted in the modern administrative
state’s conception of executive authority originating exclusively from Congress’s decision to
delegate”).
383. Complaint, Crane v. Napolitano, No. 3:12-CV-03247-O (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2012), 2012
WL 3629252; see also supra note 307.
384. Id. at 2. Similarly, Professors Robert Delahunty and John Yoo view the President as
acting only as a delegate of Congress and have argued that the Administration, through creating
DACA and declining to enforce federal immigration statutes against a specific group of persons,
amounts to a violation of the President’s duties under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.
Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of
Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 783–85
(2013).
385. Martin, supra note 54, at 167–69.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

61

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 4

1864

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

consists of comprehensive immigration reform proposals that involve
opportunities for much of the unauthorized population to eventually obtain
full citizenship.386
Should Congress enact comprehensive immigration reform that
contains legalization provisions,387 then such reform would constitute one
step towards simplifying removability. But any short-term immigration
reform in Congress is likely to involve political trade-offs, which may
preclude more fundamental reworking of the system, such as meaningful
restorations of discretionary decision making at several levels of the
immigration system. Under current law, discretionary determinations are
explicitly forbidden at various points throughout the system, especially for
immigration judges and federal courts reviewing detention and removal
decisions.388 Additionally, statutory reform that could impact complex
removability would also include scaling back some of the criminal grounds
of removability in the immigration statutes, as well as the categorical
disqualifications that prevent individuals from seeking discretionary relief.
By suggesting that Congress simplify removability by restoring
substantive relief, this Article does not mean to suggest that complex
removability is a bad thing. Rather, as described below, a second
recommendation involves allowing individuals to pursue more challenges
to removability when the law warrants. But efficiency, uniformity, and
fairness costs rise when removability challenges become the only means by
which individuals with otherwise meritorious claims to membership in the
United States can avoid deportation. Permitting more individuals to seek
discretionary relief or restructuring the statute so that the agency is required
to focus its scarce resource on individuals with more serious convictions
might simplify removability.
A second implication of rethinking removability may involve
questioning the administrative policies and judicial interpretations that fail
to allow individuals in removal proceedings to pursue removability
challenges. Broadly speaking, the current system of immigration
adjudication reflects the assumption that removability is simple, when in
386. Whether any comprehensive immigration reform will include a pathway to citizenship for
individuals who currently lack immigration status was a subject of controversy in early 2013. See
Ashley Parker, House G.O.P. Open to Residency for Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/06/us/politics/house-gop-explores-immigration-changes-short-ofcitizenship.html (reporting on House Republicans’ receptivity to providing an avenue to lawful
permanent resident status, but not citizenship, for undocumented immigrants).
387. See, e.g., Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act,
S. 744, 113th Cong. (2013).
388. E.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (2013) (forbidding the BIA from reopening proceedings “for
the purpose of affording the alien an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief . . . if
it appears that the alien’s right to apply for such relief was fully explained to him or her and an
opportunity to apply therefore was afforded at the former hearing, unless the relief is sought on the
basis of circumstances that have arisen subsequent to the hearing”).
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fact it is not, which leads to a deep disconnect between how the law is
developing (or could develop) and how it is applied.
The deficiencies in the legal framework with respect to removability
can be seen in Gabriela Cordova-Soto’s case.389 Ms. Cordova-Soto entered
the United States as an infant after her parents brought her across the
border.390 She lived in the United States for twenty-six years before ICE
apprehended her.391 While in the United States, she obtained lawful
permanent resident status, married a U.S. citizen, and had four U.S. citizen
children.392 In 2005, she was convicted for simple possession of a
controlled substance, but given a suspended sentence that involved no
actual jail time.393 Upon reporting to probation, she was referred to ICE
and placed in an immigration detention facility, where ICE agents told her
she would have no chance of winning her case and that signing a stipulated
removal order would enable her to obtain a faster deportation.394 ICE
classified the single drug possession offense as an “aggravated felony,”
which would disqualify her from seeking discretionary relief from
removal.395 Believing that she had no grounds to fight her case, Ms.
Cordova-Soto accepted the stipulated removal order, which an immigration
judge signed days later without ever speaking with her.396 What Ms.
Cordova-Soto did not know was that a circuit split had developed over
whether a single drug possession conviction did, indeed, constitute an
aggravated felony. Just five months after Ms. Cordova-Soto was removed,
the applicable federal appeals court held that the offense was not an
aggravated felony.397 That same year, the Supreme Court agreed.398 When
ICE discovered that Ms. Cordova-Soto unlawfully re-entered the country to
reunite with her family, it reinstated the prior stipulated removal order.
This led to her immediate deportation, again without an immigration court
hearing and again with no opportunity to revisit the charges lodged against

389. Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1029, 1032 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct.
647 (2012); Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2013). I worked on amicus briefs to
the BIA and the Seventh Circuit in support of administrative reopening of the respondent’s
stipulated removal order. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Immigration Law Center in Support
of Respondent, Cordova-Soto v. Holder, A091 045 891, (B.I.A. Aug. 30, 2012) (on file with
Florida Law Review); Brief of Amicus Curiae National Immigration Law Center in Support of
Petitioner Gabriela Cordova-Soto, Cordova-Soto v. Holder, No. 12-3392 (7th Cir. Mar. 8, 2013)
[hereinafter Cordova-Soto 7th Cir. Brief] (on file with Florida Law Review).
390. Cordova-Soto, 732 F.3d at 790.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 791.
393. Id. at 790; Cordovo-Soto 7th Cir. Brief, supra note 389, at 5.
394. Id. at 5.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Gonzales-Gomez v. Achim, 441 F.3d 532 (7th Cir. 2006).
398. Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 50 (2006).
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her.399 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that because Ms. Cordova-Soto
had not filed a petition for review of the original stipulated removal order
within thirty days of that order, it lacked jurisdiction to review her removal
at all.400 On further appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that the statute
prohibited her from administratively reopening the stipulated removal
order.401 Thus, Ms. Cordova-Soto never had counsel and never appeared
before an immigration judge or any other court,402 but was removed
through procedures that assumed removability (as an aggravated felon) to
be a foregone conclusion, which precluded revisiting the question.
Ms. Cordova-Soto’s case is not unique in that a wide range of laws,
policies, practices, and conditions currently allow removability to be
treated as a cursory and unreviewable matter. The desire to be released
from incarceration drives many noncitizens’ decisions to concede
removability rather than pursue potential arguments, particularly where the
law itself remains unsettled.403 Immigration judges, too, have an incentive
to gloss over the removability stage of immigration proceedings because
they face strict case completion deadlines—particularly when respondents
are detained404—and yet still face historic backlogs in the immigration
courts.405 It should come as no surprise that many respondents concede
removability or choose not to fight their removal, even if they have viable
claims.406 In other instances, immigration judges may conduct proceedings
in a manner that exerts significant pressure on respondents to concede
399. Cordova-Soto v. Holder, 659 F.3d 1029, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 647 (2012).
400. Id. at 1032 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (2012)).
401. See Cordovo-Soto v. Holder, 732 F.3d 789, 794–96 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court relied on
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012), which prohibits reopening a reinstated removal order, and
emphasized that Ms. Cordovo-Soto could have filed a timely motion to reopen within thirty days of
the stipulated removal order entered in 2005. See id. The Court acknowledged that some circuits did
not allow noncitizens to reopen their removal orders from outside of the United States at the time,
but nonetheless placed the blame on Ms. Cordovo-Soto for re-entering the country following the
removal order rather than filing a motion to reopen. See id.
402. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that “the immigration judge signed off on her 2005
stipulation without addressing whether it was intelligent and voluntary [as required by 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.25(b) (2013)], even though she was not represented by counsel during the proceedings.” Id.
at 795.
403. See Kalhan, supra note 78, at 46–47.
404. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW: CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT 4 (2006),
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/251155.pdf (stating that “EOIR evaluates the
performance of the immigration courts based on the immigration courts’ success in meeting case
completion goals”).
405. See Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog (select “Immigration” under “Charge Type”
then select “Average Days” under “What to Graph”) (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (showing a near
continual increase in immigration court wait times, from 379 days in 1998 to 763 days in 2013).
406. See Kalhan, supra note 78, at 46–47.
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removability. It is fairly common for immigration judges to hold group
removal proceedings, in which groups of up to twenty-five individuals
often concede removability and agree to removal.407 Furthermore, one
generally cannot withdraw factual admissions or concessions of
removability, absent extraordinary circumstances.408 Courts have applied
the presumption against withdrawal even where the record suggests the
possibility that the government would not have been able to establish
removability if required to do so.409 Through a variety of mechanisms,
approximately two-thirds of deportees are removed through truncated
procedures in which individuals have limited opportunities to contest
removability, and never appear before an immigration judge.410
407. Aspects of the practice of holding group removal hearings has been questioned at times
by the federal courts of appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Vasquez, 1 F.3d 751, 752–54 (9th
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (finding a violation of due process where the immigration judge held a group
deportation hearing and asked respondents to stand if they wished to waive appeal). However, the
federal courts have upheld the practice itself. See, e.g., United States v. Calles-Pineda, 627 F.2d
976, 977 (9th Cir. 1980).
408. See Velasquez, 19 I. & N. Dec. 377, 382 (B.I.A. 1986).
409. See, e.g., Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1192 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that, in
finding an alien removable, an IJ is entitled to rely upon the alien’s pleading-stage admission that he
was convicted of a removable offense); Perez-Mejia v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1143, 1153–54 (9th Cir.
2011) (treating admissions as binding, and requiring no further evidence from ICE to establish
removability even though the conviction was subject to a modified categorical approach), amended
on other grounds by 663 F.3d 403 (9th Cir. 2011); Hoodho v. Holder, 558 F.3d 184, 190–92 (2d
Cir. 2009) (holding that an attorney’s concession of an alien’s removability “obviated the need for”
the government and immigration judge to develop the record “along the lines specified by the
modified categorical approach”).
410. Nearly two-thirds of all removal orders issued in the last fiscal year involved the use of
procedures in which the individual did not appear before an immigration judge. See OFFICE OF
IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 239, at 102 (showing 391,953 removals); EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at D2, Q1 (2011),
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf (suggesting that immigration judges
entered 138,864 removal orders, or about 83% of all removal orders that were not grants of
voluntary departure). The forms of removal reflected by the Office of Immigration Statistics
Yearbook data include expedited removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (2012) (indicating that
certain aliens arriving at ports of entry “shall” be ordered removed “without further hearing or
review”), reinstatement of removal, id. § 1231(a)(5) (providing for removal, without right to
immigration court hearing, for noncitizens apprehended in the United States after the receipt of a
prior removal order); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(a) (2013) (same), and administrative removal, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1228(b) (applying to immigrants who are not lawful permanent residents and who have
convictions that are aggravated felonies); 8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(ii)–(iii) (same). In addition, though
not reported by either DHS or EOIR, approximately 14,846 individuals in fiscal year 2011 received
stipulated orders of removal from immigration judges, which involve the noncitizen waiving their
right to appear before an immigration judge. See LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER,
ENHANCING QUALITY AND TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 129 (2012),
available at http://www.acus.gov/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2012/06/Enhancing-Quality-andTimeliness-in-Immigration-Removal-Adjudication-Final-June-72012.pdf (showing 14,846
stipulated removal orders entered in 2011); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d) (stipulated removal
statute); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b) (stipulated removal regulation); Koh, supra note 255, at 478–79
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There are various ways to grapple with the implications of complex
removability from a policy and law reform perspective, some of which this
Article identifies, but each of which could serve as the subject of a separate
article. For instance, a right to government-appointed counsel for
individuals with viable challenges to removability would lead to greater
access to available legal claims.411 The role of IJs, too, might be
reexamined in light of the complexity of removability, and result in the
imposition of an increased obligation upon IJs to identify cases involving
contested removability.412 A heightened IJ burden towards respondents in
removal proceedings would impact practices such as holding group
hearings, requiring concessions of removability, or signing removal orders
without holding an in-person hearing with the respondent.413 The legal
framework governing administrative and judicial review of removal orders
should also be subject to deeper critique in light of removability’s
contested nature and the lack of consensus amongst different governmental
actors. Removability constitutes one of the few areas in which judicial
review of removal orders is squarely permitted by statute. But an intricate
series of timing requirements414 and regulatory restrictions415 can make
judicial and even administrative review challenging for pro se individuals
in particular. Without recounting each rule here, courts and agencies could
reinterpret some rules to provide for greater rights to review, particularly
where removability challenges are at issue.
Finally, rethinking removability has immediate discursive implications.
The most obvious involves the use of the term “illegal” in the media and
other public conversations about immigration.416 The term is problematic,
not only for its stigmatizing effects, but because it may be legally
inaccurate, particularly in the case of individuals who actually have a claim
to status. It obscures the various ways in which illegality is not dispositive
of one’s removability. The current public discourse on “illegal”
immigration, however, often reflects the assumption that if an individual is
“illegal,” the only logical consequence is to physically expel that individual
from the United States.
The criminal justice system provides an example of how accurate
understandings of doctrinal reality can (and should) shape public discourse.
It is well understood that in the criminal justice system, an individual is
(describing data on stipulated orders of removal prior to 2011).
411. See supra notes 332–37 and accompanying text.
412. See 8 C.F.R. § 1240.11(a)(2) (requiring IJs to advise aliens of any “apparent eligibility”
for relief).
413. See Koh, supra note 255, at 487–88 (discussing the limited procedural protections in
removal proceedings).
414. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) (requiring a petition for review to be filed within thirty
days of the date of the final order of removal).
415. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (explaining the post-departure bar).
416. See supra note 1.
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innocent until proven guilty. One result of this widespread understanding is
that media reports of criminal trials refer to persons with pending criminal
charges as a “suspect,” “alleged criminal,” or “defendant.”417 In the same
vein, public rhetoric on immigration might use a phrase like, “allegedly
removable” to describe a person suspected of violating the immigration
laws.418 Indeed, in the spring of 2013, the Associated Press announced
plans to discontinue using the term “illegal immigrant,” noting that the
word “illegal” should “only . . . refer to an action, not a person.” The
Associated Press further directed reporters to “[s]pecify wherever possible
how someone entered the country illegally and from where,” and indicated
that DREAMers “should [not] be described as having immigrated
illegally.”419 Several major media sources followed suit, citing in part the
complexity of the laws and the inaccuracy of using the terms “illegal,” and
“undocumented” to describe a person who has violated the immigration
laws.420
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this Article calls for adopting a more nuanced
understanding of removability. It places the concept of removability—
rather than unlawful immigration status—at the center of the discussion,
and outlines what removability is and why it matters in the immigration
context. Using four areas of emerging law—claims to citizenship, the
categorical approach, motions to suppress, and administrative discretion—
this Article suggests that removability is in many ways complex, contested,
417. E.g., Katherine Bindley, Michael Shane Hagger, Alleged Criminal, Taunts Police on
Facebook Page, HUFFINGTON POST (July 5, 2012, 11:51 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/07/05/michal-shane-hagger-taunts-police-on-facebook_n_1651197.html; William Glaberson,
For 3 Years After Killing, Evidence Fades as a Suspect Sits in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/16/nyregion/justice-denied-after-a-murder-in-the-bronx-asentence-to-wait.html; Bridget Murphy, Carlos Ortiz, Co-Defendant in Aaron Hernandez Case, to
Remain in Jail, for Now, HUFFINGTON POST (July 9, 2013, 12:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/09/carlos-ortiz-jail-aaron-hernandez_n_3567720.html.
418. Some immigration advocates have already started to do so. E.g., Ben Winograd,
California Governor Vetoes TRUST Act, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL IMMIGR. IMPACT (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://immigrationimpact.com/2012/10/01/california-governor-vetoes-trust-act.
419. Paul Colford, ‘Illegal Immigrant’ No More, ASSOCIATED PRESS BLOG (Apr. 2, 2013),
http://blog.ap.org/2013/04/02/illegal-immigrant-no-more.
420. Deirdre Edgar, L.A. Times Updates Guidelines for Covering Immigration, L.A. TIMES
(May 1, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/readers-rep/la-me-rr-la-timesguidelines-immigration-20130501,0,5876110.story (indicating that the term “‘[i]llegal immigrant[]’
is overly broad and does not accurately apply in every situation,” and that even “‘undocumented
immigrant[]’ similarly falls short of our goal of precision” because “[i]t is also untrue in many
cases, as with immigrants who possess passports or other documentation but lack valid visas”);
Greg Moore, Why the Denver Post Is Dropping the Term ’Illegal Immigrant,’ Except in Essential
Quotes, DENVER POST (May 2, 2013, 10:17 AM), http://blogs.denverpost.com/editors/2013/05/02/
denver-post-style-illegal-immigrant/976 (similar).
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and subject to change. It then extracts several common themes that
characterize complex removability today, and discusses the relationship
between complex removability and the absence of substantive immigration
relief; the roles of counsel, detention and time; the interplay between
removability and immigration status; the role of the government in
producing removability; and the extent to which different governmental
institutions play a role in determining removability.
This Article acknowledges that some of the implications of rethinking
removability—both simplifying removability and allowing its complexity
to bloom—are wide-ranging and raise objections regarding political
feasibility and cost. Complex removability also raises a number of
questions that have not been addressed by this Article: How might
complex removability influence the criminal justice system’s role in
immigration enforcement? How might other dimensions of complex
removability shape its broader features? Is there a normatively optimal
level of complexity that might inhere in removability? To what degree is
complex removability an inevitable feature of our immigration system?
This Article seeks to challenge some of the prevalent ways of thinking
about immigration status and the government’s ability to physically
remove people from the country. This Article recognizes the limits of some
of the proposals as well as the broader host of questions that arise, but has
sought to identify as a preliminary matter some ways in which rethinking
removability could make a difference. This analysis applies both to the way
the legal system responds to removability and also to the way the nation
thinks about immigration in everyday life. As it turns out, there is a great
deal about removability that we do not understand. This Article is a first
step towards more clarity.
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